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Resumen de la tesis 
Durante el último siglo, la economía de la innovación ha tomado una gran relevancia en los 
estudios sobre crecimiento económico. Para los estudiosos de la economía de la innovación 
el crecimiento es generado por los incrementos en productividad de las compañías que a su 
vez generan mejores niveles de productividad a nivel agregado. Este hecho llevaría a pensar 
que los países, regiones y empresas a nivel mundial estarían volcados en la inversión en 
investigación, desarrollo e innovación (I+D+i), sin embargo, existen grandes diferencias 
con las cifras a nivel agregado percibidas a nivel mundial especialmente desde el punto de 
vista privado. 
 
De tal forma, en los países menos desarrollados, la inversión en I+D+i es escasa si se le 
compara con otros países desarrollados, y desde la economía evolutiva se ha sugerido que 
estas diferencias en los niveles de inversión privada se deben en primer lugar a 
imperfecciones en los mercados que son más fuertes en estos países, pero también a 
diferencias en el entramado institucional para la innovación, es decir, los llamados Sistemas 
Nacionales de Innovación (SIN). En términos generales, estas falencias de los mercados y 
de los sistemas de innovación hacen que el nivel privado de inversión en I+D+i sea inferior 
al deseado y es necesario, de tal forma, investigar las causas e implicaciones de dichos 
factores especialmente en países menos desarrollados en los cuales se ha prestado poca o 
nula atención a estas problemáticas en el pasado. 
 
Esta tesis tiene como objetivo fundamental determinar cuáles son las fuentes de 
financiación y las particularidades de las actividades innovadoras de pequeñas empresas 
que enfrentan impedimentos a la innovación en Colombia y España. De igual forma, la tesis 
contesta otras preguntas de investigación en cada uno de los capítulos de la misma y que 
están relacionadas con el momento del proceso de innovación en el cuál las empresas 
perciben las barreras a la innovación, la estructura de capital de las empresas con mayores 
impedimentos para recaudar fondos y los efectos que tienen los subsidios de innovación en 
las pequeñas empresas innovadoras. 
 
La tesis fue desarrollada en 5 capítulos en los cuales se da respuesta a los anteriores 
interrogantes; para esto se utilizaron microdatos de las encuestas de innovación de España y 
Colombia. En el caso de España se utilizó la encuesta PITEC con datos entre 2005 y 2013 
para realizar los capítulos 2 y 4 de la tesis; estos capítulos están relacionados con la fase del 
proceso de innovación en el que se encuentra una empresa y su percepción de 
impedimentos a la innovación. De igual forma, la encuesta PITEC para España se utilizó 
para determinar los efectos que los subsidios a la innovación de forma puntual y recurrente 
tienen en pequeñas y grandes empresas de país en el largo plazo. Para el caso de la encuesta 
de innovación colombiana (EDIT) se usaron datos 2008 y 2009; esta encuesta posee la 
particularidad de preguntar a las compañías las fuentes de financiación utilizadas para sus 
procesos de innovación (fondos propios, bancos, fuentes de capital, subsidios públicos y 
otras fuentes de menor relevancia) y fue determinante para la realización del capítulo 3 de 
la tesis. 
 
En todos los capítulos se realizaron modelos econométricos para dar cuenta de la validez de 
los resultados y se utilizaron metodologías como modelos probit de panel, modelos probit 
multivariados y modelos de diferencia en diferencia condicionada (CDID). Los capítulos se 
desarrollaron previendo que los resultados de los mismos pudiesen ser publicados en el 
futuro en revistas revisadas por pares académicos y contó con la participación de los 
Doctores Asunción López y Juan Carlos Salazar como coautores de los capítulos 2 y 4, así 
como con la participación en forma de consejeros del Doctor Florentino Malaver y la 
Profesora Marisela Vargas de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana en el caso del capítulo 3. 
De igual forma, la tesis cuenta con un capítulo introductorio para contextualizar los avances 
en el campo de investigación a la fecha y un capítulo de conclusiones en el que se proponen 
directrices de política derivadas de los resultados de la investigación, así como futuras 
líneas de investigación por la cuales el doctorando espera continuar su carrera. 
 
La tesis es novedosa en el sentido que aporta soluciones para algunos vacíos teóricos 
anteriores y la generación de amplias recomendaciones de política pública relacionadas con 
la financiación de la innovación; en primer lugar, es la primera vez que se realiza un 
estudio sobre impedimentos a la innovación teniendo en cuenta un espectro más amplio del 
proceso, es decir, que no va únicamente hasta la generación del producto o servicio, sino 
que además comprende los impedimentos percibidos en la fase de comercialización de las 
innovaciones. De esta manera, se da una reinterpretación a la forma en que las empresas 
perciben estos impedimentos y se encuentra que las empresas que comercializan 
efectivamente sus innovaciones son aquellas que no los perciben de manera fuerte. Desde el 
punto de vista de la política pública esto genera la posibilidad de tener subsidios de 
innovación que no vayan exclusivamente hasta la generación de los productos o servicios 
innovadores, sino que comprendan también la comercialización de los mismos. 
 
En segundo lugar, la tesis encuentra que la estructura de capital (fuentes de financiación) 
propuesta en la literatura reciente, no aplica a países en países en vía de desarrollo como 
Colombia. En este caso, se encuentra que en Colombia las empresas innovadoras se 
financian en un orden jerárquico que comprende fondos propios como mayor fuente de 
financiación seguido por bancos, fondos gubernamentales y en último lugar por fuentes de 
capital. Esto contradice la literatura reciente dado que se supone que las empresas 
innovadoras utilizan las fuentes de capital antes que las fuentes bancarias dadas sus 
particularidades de riesgo. En la tesis se propone que las causas de este comportamiento 
son en primer lugar el tipo de empresas usadas en la literatura tradicional (grandes 
empresas que cotizan en bolsa) que no necesariamente son las que sufren de grandes 
restricciones financieras y en segundo lugar, el bajo desarrollo de los mercados de capitales 
de los países en vía de desarrollo que no permite que las empresas tengan acceso a fuentes 
de financiamiento como el capital de riesgo. Las implicaciones de política de estos 
resultados son amplias, entre ellas, se encuentra la posible generación de mercados de 
capitales para pequeñas empresas en los países en vía de desarrollo y de la creación de 
subsidios a la tasa de interés para proyectos innovadores como un complemento de las 
políticas de subsidios indirectos mediante descuentos impositivos ya aplicados 
ampliamente a nivel internacional. 
 
En tercer lugar, se encontró que los subsidios a la innovación en el largo plazo tienen efecto 
especialmente en las pequeñas empresas, mientras que en las grandes empresas dichos 
efectos son mínimos. Este resultado es novedoso porque abre la puerta para nuevas 
políticas de subsidios gubernamentales basadas en las pequeñas empresas que son las que 
más sufren las problemáticas de financiación para proyectos innovadores. De igual forma 
se encuentra que mediante la política de generación de subsidios se puede fomentar el 
empleo de alto nivel en las compañías y que es una forma por tanto de evitar impedimentos 
de conocimiento en los proyectos de innovación. Otra de las novedades de esta 
investigación es que muestra cómo la generación de una política de subsidios recurrentes 
para las empresas puede generar mayores efectos en las compañías, especialmente las 
pequeñas. Esto a su vez, genera una propuesta de política para la implementación de 
programas de innovación de largo plazo dirigido a las pequeñas empresas en lugar de 
enfocarse en una metodología de “escoger el ganador” como se ha venido haciendo en el 
pasado especialmente en países como Colombia. 
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Chapter 1. General introduction 
Since its foundation, economic science has been concerned about the optimal strategies 
needed to generate economic growth within regions and nations. The neo-
Schumpeterian approach based on markets’ evolutionary characteristics has created a 
still heterodox (although not new) explanation of economic growth created by the 
engine of innovation within firms.  
 
Thus, economic growth is created by firms, whose main objective is to elevate their 
profits developing new ways of generating production outputs and processes linked to 
that production (Nelson, 1959; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Verspagen, 2005). As regards 
evolutionary economics literature, the mechanism linking economic growth and 
innovation is productivity (Nelson, 1959). Accordingly, Griliches (1988) showed that 
Research and Development (R&D) expenditures elevate countries’ productivity, and 
therefore, it has an important impact on long-term growth in world economies; he 
presented evidence of a relationship between diminishing labor productivity in the 
1970s and a simultaneous sharp reduction in R&D expenditures in the US. Similarly, 
Brown et al. (2009) shows that there is a connection between private R&D investments 
and economic growth and suggests that the 1990s boom of R&D investments 
contributed to labor productivity growth in the U.S. economy. 
 
Given this evidence, it would be thought that investments in R&D should be an 
extended process in all regions of the world, especially in those less developed, since 
this type of investment would allow them to generate growth that leads to matching the 
developed economies. However, there are still important differences on R&D 
expenditures between countries. Trying to overcome those differences, governments 
around the world have established innovation policies to elevate the R&D expenditures 
rate in past years, an example of that is the Horizon 2020 strategy developed by the 
European Union (EU), in which one of the main goals is to elevate the rate of R&D 
expenditure to 3% of EU gross domestic product (GDP); another example is the 
Colombian government strategy to elevate R&D expenditure to 1% of its GDP (De 
Sabios, 1996). However, to date, these figures have not been reached.  
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In Figure 1, a selection of nineteen countries is showed. The abscissa axis shows the 
compound annual growth of private R&D business (1996-2014), the ordinate axis 
shows the average total R&D as a percentage of GDP (1996-2014) and the dimension of 
the bubbles shows the average private business total R&D as a percentage of GDP 
(1996-2014). There are big differences among countries; for instance, most North 
European countries, Israel, Japan, Korea, and the U.S. have higher than average total 
expenditures on R&D (1.84%) Moreover, Mexico, Portugal, China, Spain, Denmark, 
and Korea are growing their private business R&D expenditures at a higher speed than 
the average of selected countries (2.61%). Some economies like Chile, Argentina, 
Colombia, and Italy, have lower averages of total and private R&D expenditures and 
have lower growth speed. The case of Colombia is worth mentioning; it has a lower 
average of total and private R&D expenditure and a negative annual growth rate of 
3.15%. At this speed, the R&D structural differences of countries like Colombia, Chile, 
Argentina, and Italy against more developed countries like Israel, Korea, and others will 
increase in the long-term. 
Figure 1. Total R&D expenditure of selected countries (1996-2014) 
 
Source: UNESCO. Chile (2007-2014), Mexico (1996-2011), Norway (1997-2014), Sweden (1997-2014), 
and the USA (1996-2013) 
The fact that Latin American countries (Colombia, Chile, Argentina and Mexico) show 
lower R&D expenditures and paces, while in some countries like Israel, Korea, or 
Denmark, these figures are high, leads one examine the causes of such differences 
between countries. At first sight, the bubbles dimension in Figure 1 gives some clues 
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about a critical R&D phenomenon (i.e., the amount of private R&D expenditures in 
each country). Countries with the lowest expenditures in R&D like Colombia, Chile, 
Argentina, and Mexico have lower private business expenditures on R&D. In Figure 2, 
a comparison of the expenditures of R&D by those selected countries is shown. In 
countries like Colombia, Chile, Mexico, or Argentina, private business participation in 
the total R&D expenditure is minimal, with Colombia having the lowest level of all 
selected countries with 32% of total R&D expenditure. Additionally, countries in which 
the total R&D expenditure is above average present higher levels of private 
participation within R&D expenditures; countries like Korea, Japan, Finland, Sweden, 
or Israel, display levels higher than 70% of total R&D expenses. 
Figure 2. Total R&D by sector of performance (1996-2014) 
 
Source: UNESCO. Chile (2007-2014), Mexico (1996-2011), Norway (1997-2014), Sweden (1997-2014), 
and the USA (1996-2013). Others include non-profit organizations and universities. 
In this sense, it is possible to argue that the amounts of private R&D expenditures are 
related to the low total R&D expenditures at the national level. We do not yet fully 
understand the reasons behind those low levels of private R&D investment, or the 
differences between countries. However, the literature in the last century have been 
focused on some plausible explanations for this issue. 
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First, there are factors hampering private business expenditure on innovative activities. 
This issue has been researched since the seminal works of Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962); in general, private investment in innovation is highly risky from the financial 
point of view, mostly because it requires high levels of cash flow, is a costly long-term 
venture, is highly uncertain, and sometimes produces outcomes that are intangible. 
Those factors are caused by market failures like information asymmetry and the 
impossibility of full outcomes appropriation; those market failures elevate the risk and 
costs of innovation ventures relative to investments based on traditional capital assets 
(Hall & Lerner, 2010).  
 
Thus, firms trying to implement innovation activities face strong impediments trying to 
raise money from internal and external sources. First, internal funds are scarce and 
sometimes available cash flow has to be used to cover other types of expenditures, 
especially if a company is cash restrained, as is the typical case in young and small 
firms (Hall & Lerner, 2010). In addition, innovative firms trying to raise money from 
external sources face high financial direct and sunk costs given the intangible nature of 
innovation and its uncertainty characteristics. Therefore, all those factors shaping the 
way innovative firms finance their Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) 
expenditures should be understood to generate optimal policies to elevate firms’ 
expenditure on R&D, especially for firms, regions, and countries with low innovation 
activities like the ones posted in Figure 1. In recent years, the study of those failures has 
been favored by the researches of impediments to innovation using innovation surveys. 
 
Second, some academics have proposed that differences in innovative inputs within 
countries, like the ones shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, may be due to the different 
organizational and institutional mixtures and relationships present in innovative markets 
across countries. For economies in which the private investment in R&D is low, it is 
consistent to think that the development of strong organizations backing up innovation 
is necessary, in that sense, one of the main functions of those organizations and 
institutions is to ease the way in which firms and more generally, the market, perceive 
and face impediments to innovation. This academic approach began with the seminal 
work of Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992), and Nelson (1993); for Freeman, these 
relations are framed in what is known as the National Systems of Innovation (NSI), that 
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he defined as “the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies.” 
 
In the same way, Edquist (2010), proposes that one of the fundamental activities of 
NSIs is the financing of private innovation activities facilitating commercialization and 
adoption of technologies; for countries with low amounts of private R&D expenditures, 
it is possible that some of the institutional and organizational framework already 
developed in countries like Israel, Korea, and other countries are not yet fully 
developed. 
 
In that sense, researchers have tried to uncover the complexities of the relationship 
among impediments, finance, and the institutional framework of innovation, trying to 
understand the causes behind the differences in R&D expenditures around the world. In 
that respect, since Schumpeter it has been argued that the relationship between 
innovation and its financial arrangement is fundamental to understand economic cycles 
and development: 
 
The logical relation (…), between what is called “credit creation by banks” and 
innovation, will not be lost again. This relationship, which is fundamental to the 
understanding of the capitalist engine, is at the bottom of all the problems of 
money and credit, at least as far as they are not simply problems of public 
finance (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 111). 
 
In addition, Schumpeter understood that there are some issues with the relationship 
between financial markets and innovation created by information asymmetries, and that 
these failures make financial market organizations misread the innovation phenomenon: 
 
…the failure of the banking community to function in the way required by the 
structure of the capitalist machine accounts for most of the events which the 
majority of observers would call “Catastrophes.” It is but natural that since such 
failure primarily shows in dealing with novel propositions —where judgment is 
most difficult and temptation strongest—an association has developed between 
financing innovation and miscarriage or misconduct which, however 
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understandable, does not make analysis any easier (Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 117-
118). 
 
However, even though a great number of efforts have been made in the last century to 
understand innovation impediments, financial arrangement, and innovation framework, 
and even now that microdata is available to research this issue, it is still difficult for 
firms, academia, and policy makers to understand financing innovation phenomenon 
deeply. Therefore, firms still face market failures impeding private R&D expenditure 
and decelerating the pace of productivity, and countries around the world still need to 
complete the introduction of an institutional framework in order to back up private 
innovation funding, especially in underdeveloped economies. 
 
Literature about the finance of innovation has made it known that young, small, and 
medium sized and high technology innovative firms tend to confront innovation 
impediments in higher proportions than their counterparts; additionally, financial 
markets’ evolution supports the creation of instruments like venture capital, and 
institutions like small firms’ exchange markets to overcome impediments of innovative 
and high growth firms. However, those instruments and institutions are highly 
specialized and not available to all companies, especially in emerging markets in which 
the number of venture capital firms or angel investments and investors are minimal. In 
that sense, the Edquist (2010) approach to NSI is relevant (i.e. it is necessary to create 
and develop financial instruments and institutions backing up innovative ventures). 
 
Nevertheless, the literature has uncovered some clues about how big, publicly traded 
firms finance their innovation ventures, but we still do not fully understand how market 
failures shape the capital structure of smaller, private innovative firms. Likewise, for 
firms confronting strong innovation impediments, governments around the world have 
developed financing instruments like subsidies with the aim of increasing innovation 
activity and generating positive knowledge spillovers on markets. However, we still do 
not fully understand the effects of those instruments in the long-term innovative 
behavior of firms. 
 
Many additional questions remain unanswered in the financing-innovation framework. 
This dissertation is a small effort to increase knowledge about this phenomenon using 
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microdata for firms located in Spain and Colombia; in general, the dissertation focuses 
on a broad research question: what are the financing sources and innovative 
particularities of small innovative firms facing innovation impediments? 
Further, this dissertation tries to answer some specific research questions that will be 
answered in each of the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 2: 
 In what phase of innovation process do small firms tend to perceive financial, 
knowledge, and market impediments related to the innovation phenomenon? 
 Which impediments are perceived by firms already profiting from innovation? 
 
Chapter 3: 
 What are the main characteristics of firms’ founding innovation activities 
through internal, banking, equity, and public sources of funds? 
 How can the capital structure of firms performing innovation activities in an 
underdeveloped country like Colombia be characterized? 
 
Chapter 4: 
 What are the long-term impacts of innovation subsidies granted by governments 
on input and output variables of firms? 
 What is the long-term effect of recurrence on innovation subsidies in the 
innovative performance of companies? 
 
Providing answers to these questions is fundamental from the policy point of view, 
since it will allow the development of better intervention measures, organizations, and 
institutions, so that companies can overcome innovation impediments, finance 
innovation projects more efficiently, and, in turn, generate knowledge, innovative 
products and processes more efficiently and in the long-term, generate economic 
growth. Specifically, this thesis deals with the effect of innovation impediments, 
financing innovation, and public subsidies on small and medium-sized firms versus 
bigger companies, because the latter tend to perceive market failures in higher degrees 
(Hall & Lerner, 2010). 
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1.1.General data and methodology 
Collecting data about the innovation activity and financial behavioral of innovative 
firms is not an easy task, and collecting comparable data about these topics is even 
harder. However, beginning in the early 1990s some countries have performed the 
titanic labor of gathering data about innovation activities at the firm level in order to 
generate better indicators than the typical ones used in the 1970s and 1980s. In that 
sense, in 1992 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
issued the Oslo Manual; this document was developed for two main goals, providing 
guidelines to create, measure, and compare innovation indicators within OECD country 
members, and discussing the analytical problems to which those indicators are relevant 
(OECD, 1997). 
 
Following the guidelines of the Oslo Manual, the EU developed the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) as a large-scale attempt to compare inputs and outputs of 
innovation activities of firms around the EU (Arundel & Smith, 2013), and since the 
year 2004 the survey has been applied every two years. A special case of the CIS is the 
“Panel de innovación tecnológica” (PITEC). Developed by Spanish government, this 
survey is developed on a yearly basis and is accessible freely. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, the PITEC data base was used in Chapter 2 (2003-2013) in an attempt to 
measure the perception of innovation impediments of Small and Medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), and in chapter 4 (2007-2013) to measure the impact of government 
subsidies on the innovation activity of Spanish firms. 
 
Following the EU survey activities, some other regions of the world have developed 
their own surveys based on the criteria of the Oslo Manual, especially in Latin America 
(Salazar & Holbrook, 2004). In that sense, special attention needs to be paid to the 
exercises carried in countries like Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, or 
Colombia. For Colombia, two surveys have been developed, the first for manufacture 
industries (EDIT-Encuesta de innovación tecnológica) and the second for services and 
commerce (EDITS-Encuesta de innovación Tecnológica en Sectores de Servicios y 
Comercio) industries. These surveys have been carried on since 2005 and 2006, 
respectively; for this dissertation, the 2007-2009 EDIT was used to determine the 
funding sources that Colombian innovative firms use to finance their innovation 
ventures.  
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The methodologies used for this dissertation were panel probit models, multivariate 
probit models, and conditional difference in differences (CDID); each of these 
methodologies was used in order to overcome some specific issues or advantages of the 
data. In addition, some limitations of this thesis arise from the data and methodologies 
chosen. In the first place, in the case of Colombia, only one wave of the EDIT survey 
was available even when there were multiple waves of this survey; the limited access to 
safe repositories in Bogota´s national statistical office (DANE) and restrictions about 
the international transference of data did not allow access to other waves of the survey. 
Moreover, this survey does not allow access to output variables such as company 
revenues that would have been valuable to cross-refer information about financial 
behavior and output variables of firms. Likewise, in the case of the long-term effect of 
public subsidies on Spanish firms, the CDID methodology uses a linear approximation 
to measure the innovative performance of firms. In this regard, behavioral variables like 
cooperation, innovation, and patent propensity are measured by the PITEC as binary or 
count variables; therefore, it was not possible to verify if there were effects on the long-
term innovative behavior variables of firms. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. In the second chapter, research about the perception 
of innovation impediments of SME manufacture firms in Spain for the years 2005-2013 
is presented. This chapter tries to uncover the way that innovation impediments act on 
firms during the innovation process with a dynamic approach; in that sense, special 
attention is paid to the different forms of market failures through firms’ perceptions of 
impediments to innovation from the beginning until the end of the process. Chapter 3 
presents research dealing with the funding sources and capital structure of innovative 
firms in Colombia; specifically, this chapter deals with the effects of market failures on 
access to specific funding sources like cash flow, banks, equity, and government 
subsidies in a country with underdeveloped financial markets and with the structure of 
capital markets in underdeveloped countries. In Chapter 4, and given that firms facing 
strong market failures tend to have low expenditures on innovation, research on the 
long-term effects that government subsidies have on Spanish firms was carried out. In 
this chapter, special attention is paid to the difference of the effects of those subsidies on 
input and output innovation variables and to the firm size as a fundamental variable to 
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determine those effects. Finally, in Chapter 5 the general conclusions of the thesis, the 
policy impacts, and a proposal for a future research agenda are presented.  
 
The functional form given to this dissertation, separated into three chapters with 
different but related objectives, has as its objective the short-term submitting of these 
chapters to peer-reviewed journals once the thesis is approved. Additionally, even 
though in this thesis my role was as a principal investigator, the coauthors of Chapters 2 
and 4 are Juan Carlos Salazar and Asunción López from Universidad Autónoma de 
Madrid, and I want to give credit to them. For Chapter 3, I received valuable 
contributions from Florentino Malaver and Maricela Vargas from Pontificia 
Universidad Javeriana, especially in factors related to data collection. Notwithstanding 
the great support I have received from all of them, the responsibility for any errors or 
omissions remains my own.  
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Chapter 2. A dynamic approach to the role of 
innovation barriers: a longitudinal analysis for 
Spanish manufacturing SMEs 
 
2.1.Introduction 
In his much-celebrated article, Teece (1986) attempted to explain why innovating firms 
often fail to obtain significant economic returns from innovation. He highlighted the 
fact that, in order to produce a successful innovation, it is not only necessary to generate 
the “core knowledge” embedded in a new product but also the capabilities to 
appropriate the benefits of the new product (or at least part of them) in markets. In this 
sense, a successful innovation requires not only an invention plan but also an 
appropriation plan involving the management of production and commercialization of 
new products. Or, equivalently, firms’ success in the “invention” stage of innovation 
process does not imply success in the “appropriation” (or commercialization) stage. 
 
Although this approach explicitly tackles the analysis of barriers faced by innovative 
firms in the production and commercialization phase (i.e., the appropriation stage, after 
the generation of the invention), empirical research relating firm’s perception of barriers 
to innovation and its corresponding innovation performance has overlooked the 
contribution of Teece in the analysis. Using firm-level panel data from the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS, Spain), we show that the convergence of these two lines of 
research allows us to obtain consistent and intuitive empirical results through firm-level 
analysis, by assigning each type of barrier to a specific stage of the innovation process.  
Our approach and results also contribute to the discussion that has taken place in 
specialized literature regarding to the counterintuitive results obtained in some empirical 
research using microdata (i.e., that the propensity to innovate is positively related with 
perceived barriers to innovation). Several interpretations of this result have been 
provided. Baldwin & Lin (2002) argue that innovation is a learning process in which 
innovators daily face problems that need to be solved, but firms with no innovation 
activities simply do not have to confront those impediments and therefore they do not 
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perceive them. Mohnen et al. (2008) conclude that innovative firms are prone to 
perceive barriers because both phenomena—innovation and barriers—are determined 
by the same factors, i.e., firms perceiving barriers are those actively involved in 
innovation activities. Savignac (2008), working with economic/financial barriers, argues 
that this unexpected result is due to a selection bias of their sample, in which firms not 
willing to innovate, and therefore not perceiving barriers, are also asked about 
impediments to innovation, concluding that there is a positive relationship between 
innovation results and barriers. In the same direction D'Este et al. (2012) argue that 
there are revealed barriers for innovative firms, i.e., barriers perceived by firms within 
the innovation process, and deterrent barriers, i.e., barriers discouraging firms from 
starting innovative activities. Therefore, if we want to capture these effects, it is 
necessary to select only firms “interested” in innovation activities. Aligned with this 
recommendation, Blanchard et al. (2013) analyzed the impact of perceived barriers on 
innovation performance, focusing only on those firms actively trying to innovate, 
concluding that barriers are inversely related with innovation propensity.  
 
Although specialized empirical research on this area (using CIS-type surveys) has 
mainly focused on economic/financial barriers, other studies have analyzed the impact 
of different types of nonfinancial barriers, including “market barriers.” In those cases, 
market barriers are related to performance in the invention stage (i.e., the creation of a 
new product) and not in the commercialization stage. As we will see in our research, 
these market barriers are considered, according to our nomenclature, as barriers 
perceived in the commercialization stage. Our results will show that a proper selection 
of a variable of performance in this last stage of the innovation process provides 
consistent results regarding the relation between market barriers and innovation 
performance. 
 
In this researc, we extend these previous ideas, introducing the analysis of diverse types 
of barriers (cost-funding, knowledge, and market) in different stages of the innovation 
process (i.e., the invention or appropriation stage). We show not only that barriers have 
significant impact on firms’ propensity to innovate (as in Blanchard et al., 2013) but 
also that the perception of knowledge barriers is typical for firms “failing” in the 
invention stage; that economic/financial barriers are typical also in the invention stage 
regardless of the outcome of this stage (failure or success); that market barriers are 
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typical among firms “failing” in the appropriation stage; and, finally, that success in 
both stages of the innovation process is characterized by the perception of no barriers. 
With our approach, therefore, we contribute to the understanding and explanation of 
counterintuitive results, that barriers exhibit a direct relationship to the propensity to 
innovate. In this research, our results show that each stage of the innovation process is 
influenced by different type of barriers, and also, that the perception of barriers has an 
intuitive explanation regarding the sign of the effect for each analysis stage. 
 
The data set used is a sample of 3,256 manufacturing Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) during the period 2005-2013, included in the Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC, per its acronym in Spanish), which is a panel constructed with the information 
from the Community Innovation Survey for Spain (CIS-Spain). The general idea of the 
empirical research of our study is to analyze the propensity either to fail or succeed in 
each of two stages of innovation process: invention and commercialization. This 
approach leads us to four models (two for each stage). All models were estimated using 
probit regressions with panel data techniques. 
 
As explained before, many studies found a counterintuitive positive relation between 
perceived barriers and innovation performance. Pellegrino and Savona (2013) suggested 
that there are some problems with data that might cause these types of results. The first 
one is the presence of unobserved firms’ specific factors. The second is a specific 
source of bias that is linked to an inappropriate selection of the relevant sample for the 
analysis. To overcome the first problem, we used panel data techniques to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity among firms. The second problem was tackled by selecting a 
sample of firms “willing to innovate,” as proposed by Savignac (2008), D’Este et al. 
(2012), and Blanchard et al. (2013). 
 
A brief summary of the procedure and results is presented in Figure 3. This figure was 
adapted from Pellegrino and Savona (2013) to include the commercialization stage of 
the innovation process. It can be seen that we restricted our analysis to those firms 
willing to innovate, (1) using firms with positive expenditures on Research, 
development and innovation (R&D&I) at least once during 2005-2013 and (2) 
eliminating firms declaring that they were not interested in innovation. Our results show 
that the perception of economic/financial barriers was typical in the invention stage, 
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regardless of the outcome of the stage (failure or success). On the other hand, 
knowledge barriers provided an explanation for “failure” in this initial stage of the 
innovation process, meaning that succeeding at this stage implied overcoming such 
knowledge constraints. During the commercialization stage of the innovation process, 
“failure” was characterized by the perception of market barriers, while “success” could 
be explained as a situation of perceiving no barriers. 
Figure 3. Research procedure and main results 
 
Source: Authors, adapted from Pellegrino and Savona (2013) 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we review the specialized literature 
analyzing the relationship between perceived barriers and innovation performance, with 
specific emphasis on empirical analysis based on the use of CIS-type microdata. We 
expand the approach of this literature with the introduction of Teece’s framework in 
Section 2.2.2. In Section 2.3, the data and methodology are discussed. Results are 
presented in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.2.Literature review 
2.2.1. Perception of barriers and innovation performance 
Seminal works by Arundel (1997), Mohnen & Rosa (2001), Baldwin & Lin (2002), and 
Canepa & Stoneman (2002) opened a path of research about innovation barriers’ 
perception and their effects on firms’ innovation activity. This path has been followed 
by several authors, especially based on European data using the CIS, which contains 
specific questions about the factors hampering innovation activities in firms. 
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Much of this literature (Tourigny & Le, 2004; Silva et al., 2008; Segarra-Blasco et al., 
2008; Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2009; Blanchard et al., 2013; Pellegrino & Savona, 2013) 
seeks to determine the relationship between innovation barriers and firms’ propensity to 
innovate; generally, this literature concludes that economic/financial and knowledge 
barriers are the most relevant factors deterring firms’ innovation; equally, this literature 
shows that there are some firm characteristics, such as size, age, innovation intensity, 
corporate composition, and location, that determine firms’ perception of barriers 
(Iammarino et al., 2007). Although this literature has made important contributions to 
understand how barriers affects firms, the whole process of innovation cannot be 
measured only until the moment a firm develops their products or services, because if 
the firm cannot take its innovations into the market and generate revenues from them, it 
is not achieving the proposed objectives of innovation, i.e., the literature does not 
distinguish among barriers perceived during the invention and commercialization 
processes. 
 
2.2.2. Barriers through the different stages of the innovation process 
At the same time, there is a literature arm seeking to determine how innovation barriers 
affect firms in different stages of the innovation process, i.e., before innovation projects 
start or while firms are developing an idea into a product or process. Canepa & 
Stoneman’s (2002) study, which, as we know, was the first of this type, sought to prove 
how economic/financial barriers determined the likelihood of not starting, delaying, or 
abandoning an innovation project in different European countries; they found that 
economic/financial barriers are important impediments for firms wanting to start an 
innovation project but are not important when firms abandon initiated projects. In a 
similar vein, Galia & Legros (2004) found that the likelihood of postponing an 
innovation project rises when firms have a high perception of economic/financial 
barriers, but the likelihood of abandoning a started project increases when perceptions 
of market and knowledge barriers rise. Similarly, Savignac (2008) investigated if 
French firms engage in innovation activities when they perceive barriers to innovation, 
and found that the likelihood of realizing such activities is negatively related to 
economic/financial barriers. 
As Galia & Legros (2004) Mohnen et al. (2008) found that economic/financial barriers 
perceived by Dutch firms decreased the likelihood of starting an innovation project and 
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were positively related to the likelihood of delay or prematurely stopping those projects. 
Similarly, they found that firms used to abandon their projects because of market and 
knowledge barriers, but to a lesser extent against the economic/financial barriers. They 
found also that the perception of economic/financial barriers reinforces the perception 
of market and knowledge barriers. Likewise, García-Vega & López (2010) found that 
Spanish firms tend to suffer market barriers in higher proportions, but 
economic/financial barriers are responsible for the abandonment of projects. 
 
D'Este et al. (2012) and Blanchard et al. (2013) show that innovation barriers have 
dissimilar impacts if firms are involved in different stages of the innovation process; in 
that sense, there are deterring barriers that prevent firms from engaging in innovation 
activities, while there are revealed barriers that firms perceive when they are actively 
involved in innovation. According to these studies, it is important to separate firms 
involved in innovation activities from those willing to innovate but not habituated to the 
process, because the perception of barriers by these firms will be dissimilar.  
 
Even when this branch of literature has tried to deliver a broader view of the innovation 
process and its relationship to barriers to innovation, it has failed to integrate a holistic 
vision of the innovation process, because it does not link other stages to it. A firm can 
be affected by different types of barriers in the conception or in the production stages 
and even can overcome them; however, this does not guarantee that firms can directly 
benefit from its innovations, because if the firm cannot sell its goods, innovation is not 
complete. So, if the marketing phase of innovation is also affected by specific barriers, 
firms will be in jeopardy when they are not allowed to overcome those impediments. 
 
The fact that the market phase has been neglected in economic analyses was pointed out 
by Teece (1986), who highlighted the fact that in order to produce a successful 
innovation, it is not only necessary to generate the “core knowledge” embedded in the 
new product but also that the firm has to appropriate the benefits (or at least part of 
them) from its innovation activities. In this sense, a successful innovation requires not 
only an invention plan but also an appropriation plan involving the management of 
production and commercialization capabilities. This line of research has produced 
significant advances in providing a more comprehensive approach to innovation 
management (Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen & Puumalainen, 2007; Castellacci, 2008; Pérez-
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Cano, 2013; Henttonen et al., 2015); however, this line of research has been 
disconnected from the analysis of barriers to innovation. This is one of the contributions 
of this research; we argue that in order to understand the effects of barriers to 
innovation, it is necessary to include a holistic view of the innovation process. In this 
context, the hypothesis we are seeking to prove is that (H1) innovation barriers can 
affect appropriation (commercialization) phases of the innovation process as well, and 
that (H2) successful firms, i.e., firms taking inovative goods into the market, are those 
that can find the best way to overcome innovation barriers. 
 
2.3.Data and methodology 
2.3.1. Data 
Data used for this research come from the Spanish Technologic Innovation Panel 
(PITEC, according to its acronym in Spanish). This database summarizes the responses 
of Spanish companies in the CIS between 2003 and 2013. The survey is conducted 
annually and contains panel data for companies in the manufacturing and service 
sectors.  
 
Specifically, we used manufacturing companies with more than 10 and fewer than 250 
employees who responded to the survey between 2005 and 2013. We used this sample 
because, as reported in literature reviews, small and medium-size firms report being 
affected by innovation barriers in higher proportions. In order to control for firms not 
interested in innovation activities, we included only firms that made expenditures on 
R&D&I at least once between 2005 and 2013. Similarly, firms answering that they were 
not interested in innovation activities were excluded from the sample in the year of that 
response, that is, a firm could be excluded in one year if in that particular moment in 
time they answered that they did not want to conduct innovation activities, but the same 
firm could be included in other years if they did not answer that question positively.  
 
In line with our literature review, we were interested in determining in which part of the 
innovation process firms were more likely to experience innovation barriers. In Table 1 
one can see that firms in the sample were more likely to fail taking inventions to market 
(28%) than in their development of inventions (5%). A significant number of firms 
(80%) were able to develop inventions, but a smaller number of those firms (70%) were 
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capable of selling their inventions in the market. With regard to innovation barriers, 
firms seemed to report more frequently that economic/financial barriers affected them in 
a strong way (51%), and a strong effect of market barriers (33%) seemed to be more 
frequent than knowledge barriers (24%). 
Table 1. Variable summary statistics 
 
Full survey Sample 
 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N 
failure 0.04 0.20 12,620 0.05 0.21 3,278 
fail_market 0.20 0.40 12,754 0.28 0.45 3,282 
invention 0.69 0.46 12,839 0.80 0.40 3,282 
succes 0.56 0.50 12,755 0.70 0.46 3,282 
eco_fin_barr 0.47 0.50 12,620 0.51 0.50 3,278 
know_barr 0.22 0.41 12,620 0.24 0.43 3,278 
market_barr 0.29 0.45 12,620 0.33 0.47 3,278 
size (log) 4.20 1.66 12,755 3.90 0.88 3,282 
inn_exp (log) 4.88 4.23 12,755 6.24 3.63 3,282 
pub_funds 0.30 0.46 12,620 0.36 0.48 3,278 
group 0.40 0.49 12,749 0.34 0.47 3,282 
pat 0.11 0.31 12,754 0.14 0.35 3,282 
htec 0.03 0.17 12,839 0.08 0.27 3,282 
mhtec 0.12, 0.33 12,839 0.37 0.48 3,282 
 
2.3.2. Methodology 
In order to determine the way that innovation barriers affect the process of innovation, a 
panel data probit model for PITECs between 2005 and 2013 was performed. Following 
the Teece (1986) aproach, we divided the innovation process in two phases: (i) the 
invention phase, from the conception of the innovation project to its crystallization in a 
new product or process; and (ii) the appropriation phase, where the firm designs a 
strategy to profit from its innovative activities in the market.  
 
We were interested in determining which effects innovation barriers had on firms’ 
likelihood of failing or succeeding in the invention and appropriation phases; following 
that notion, the empirical research consisted of four models divided into failure and 
success in the invention and appropriation phases. All models had the same set of 
independent variables and the same sample; we used the random-effects probit 
regression, because the estimators for the fixed-effects technique could be biased. 
 
In order to define if a firm failed in the invention phase (failure) we use a binary 
variable in which 1 represented firms that abandoned projects in the conception phase, 
firms that abandoned started innovation projects, or firms without innovation outcomes. 
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For success in the invention phase (invention_success), we used a binary variable with 1 
representing a firm that developed product or process innovations. Failure in the 
appropriation binary variable (fail_market) was 1 when a company with a product or 
process innovation had no revenues for innovation. Finally, for success in the 
appropriation phase (success), we considered a binary variable equal to 1 for firms with 
revenues related to innovation. Given that we have a panel data set, firms could have 
been in a subset in one year but change category in the next one, e.g., a firm could fail 
in the invention process in one year and succeed in the appropriation phase a few years 
later; therefore, we considered the evolutionary nature of the innovation process inside 
firms. 
 
The model used to determine the relationship between innovation barriers and 
innovation outcomes grouped barriers into three different categories defined by PITEC; 
the economic/financial category included (I) lack of funds for the firm or group of 
firms, (II) lack of external financial funds, and (III) innovation is too expensive. 
Knowledge barriers included (IV) lack of qualified personnel, (V) lack of information 
about technology, (VI) lack of information about markets, and (VII) difficulties finding 
cooperative partners. Finally, market barriers included (VIII) market dominated by 
established enterprises and (IX) uncertainty regarding market demand for innovative 
goods and services. For each of the three categories, we included a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if a firm had a strong perception of any of the barriers composing each 
category. 
 
The model also includes control variables like the log of the number of employees, log 
of the innovation expenditure by employee (inn_exp), a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the company cooperated with other firms in that particular period (coopera), a variable 
equal to 1 if the company received public funds for R&D and innovation activities 
(pub_funds), and a dummy variable equal 1 if the firms was part of a business group 
(group). We also included a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm had any patent 
applications (pat), a variable equal to 1 if the firm was in high technology sectors (htec), 
and a dummy variable for firms in medium high technology sectors (mhtec). Finally, we 
considered the effect of time, including a set of year dummies. So, the model to verify 
the relationship between innovation barriers and results was as follows: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐼[𝛽
′𝑍𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿
′𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 > 0] 
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where 𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 represents each one of the types of failure and success defined above (Table 
1), 𝑍𝑗,𝑡  is the control variable vector, 𝑌𝑗,𝑡  represents the three groups of innovation 
barriers, 𝑐𝑡  is the unobserved invariant time effects, and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  is the idiosyncratic error 
term; the models were estimated using a panel probit methodology with random effects. 
 
2.4.Results 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results in Table 2, we are going to analyze 
the results for each one of the models in separate ways. 
2.4.1. Invention phase: failure 
Sometimes, it is possible that companies, despite making innovation expenditures, fail 
in their attempts to develop new products and processes; our probit model shows that 
smaller firms are likeliest to fail in the invention phase, while companies with lower 
investments in innovation activities and firms belonging to an industrial group fail in 
larger proportions. Cooperation seems to diminish the likelihood of failing, and high 
and medium high technology firms are more prone to fail in the invention phase. 
 
As barriers to innovation refers, economic/financial and knowledge barriers have 
influence in the failure on invention phase. It seems that funding, costs, manpower, 
cooperation and information are fundamental factors at the beginning of the process. 
These results are aligned with those described in the review of the literature section.  
 
2.4.2. Invention phase: invention success 
The results of the probit model show that the largest SMEs are likely to succeed in the 
invention phase; likewise, firms with the highest innovation expenditures, cooperation 
agreements, and patent applications are more likely to be successful inventors. 
Surprisingly, the fact that a firm belongs to a high or medium high technology sector is 
not related to its propensity to develop new products and processes, that is, a firm can 
be inventive independent of the sector to which belongs. 
 
Regarding barriers to innovation, success in the invention phase is positively related 
with economic/financial barriers, i.e., a firm with a strong perception of 
economic/financial barriers is likeliest to finish successfully its invention ventures. One 
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could think that this is a counterintuitive result because if a firm is inventive, how can 
this firm perceive that economic/financial barriers prevent it from inventing 
successfully? In the context of our investigation, this can have a consistent explanation. 
If a firm has success in the initial phase of the innovation process, but this firm cannot 
profit from those projects, i.e., the appropriation process is not developed correctly, a 
firm can perceive that its whole effort was meaningless because the firm now has an 
invention that cannot be taken to market; it is clear that the whole process created new 
knowledge and maybe other spillovers for the firm and society, but in the short term the 
firm could perceive that the innovation process was extremely costly. Therefore, it’s 
consistent to find a positive relationship between success in the invention phase and 
positive cost-funding barriers to innovation.  
Table 2: Results of the econometric models 
Variables 
Invention phase Appropriation phase 
failure success failure success 
Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value Coef P-value 
Barriers:                 
   eco_fin_barr 0.100** 0.019 0.130*** 0.000 0.039 0.136 0.029 0.324 
   know_barr 0.099** 0.039 -0.061 0.136 -0.040 0.180 -0.032 0.340 
   market_barr 0.017 0.700 0.058 0.120 0.054** 0.046 0.0326 0.285 
Control variables:                 
   size -0.146*** 0.000 0.203*** 0.000 0.048** 0.048 0.228*** 0.000 
   inn_exp -0.139*** 0.000 0.033*** 0.000 0.013** 0.002 0.037*** 0.000 
   coopera -0.268*** 0.000 0.483*** 0.000 -0.033 0.229 0.472*** 0.000 
   pub_funds -0.037 0.422 -0.158*** 0.000 -0.096*** 0.000 -0.021 0.484 
   group 0.171** 0.002 -0.044 0.372 0.014 0.725 -0.040 0.349 
   pat -0.027 0.659 0.597*** 0.000 -0.125*** 0.000 0.367*** 0.000 
   htec 0.319** 0.002 0.046 0.646 -0.071 0.410 -0.109 0.233 
   mhtec 0.252*** 0.000 0.058 0.288 0.255*** 0.000 -0.222*** 0.000 
_cons -1,207*** 0.000 0.494*** 0.000 -0.853*** 0.000 -0.186 0.104 
Num. obs. 25,987 25,987 25,987 25,987 
Num. firms 3,256 3,256 3,256 3,256 
LR χ² (19) 1,029.5 931.9 160.8 1,225.7 
Prob > χ² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: For simplification, the results of time-effects dummies are not reported. 
*P. <0.05; **P.<0.01; ***P.<0.001 
The fact that knowledge barriers, where not significant for success in the invention 
phase, can be a signal that in order to successfully develop an innovation, firms have to 
properly overcome knowledge barriers perceived as relevant when firms fail in the 
invention phase. 
 
2.4.3. Appropriation phase: failure 
The likelihood that a company cannot bring products and processes developed in the 
invention phase to market is positively related to the size of the firm, that is, the largest 
SMEs fail more in their attempt to reach the market. So size is a determinant in the 
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likelihood of success in the invention phase, but it does not guarantee success in the 
appropriation phase. Likewise, firms with higher innovation expenditures per employee 
seem to fail more to reach the market. This last result can be related to the size results 
explained above, because big firms are the ones with highest per-employee R&D&I 
budget. 
 
Public funds are negatively related to failure to reach the market, i.e., when a firm uses 
public subsidies for innovation, the probability of failure to bring products to market is 
reduced; likewise, firms without patent applications are likeliest to fail bringing 
innovation to market, maybe firms that perceive that it’s difficult to reach the market do 
not try to protect their inventions, because this means cost overruns.  
 
Economic/financial and knowledge barriers are not related to failure in the 
appropriation phase; however, market barriers are related to this type of failure, so in 
that sense, the perception that there are big firms competing for markets or that demand 
for products and processes is uncertain tends to increase the likelihood of firms not 
reaching the market. 
 
The fact that market barriers alienate firms from their possible clients shows that even 
companies that are in advanced stages of the process of innovation are not prepared to 
overcome market impediments or to understand how those impediments can prevent 
them from successful innovation. The hypothesis that a firm can successfully develop 
products and processes but not reach the market due to specific barriers was proved 
(H1): market issues prevent firms from receiving revenue from their innovations. 
 
2.4.4. Appropriation phase: success 
Larger companies seem likely to succeed in reaching the market; it seems that bigger 
firms have a greater likelihood of both failing and succeeding in selling their 
innovations. This could be due to the fact that a small proportion of small firms reach 
the appropriation phase, because they tend to fail more in the invention phase, as we 
showed in section 2.2. Likewise, firms with higher budgets for innovation activities also 
seem to fail and succeed in bigger proportions in the appropriation phase, and given that 
firms with low budgets tend to fail more in the invention phase, we believe that this is 
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because firms with lower budgets tend to reach the last phase of innovation process in 
smaller proportions. 
 
Regarding cooperation, firms with these types of agreements tend to be more successful 
than firms without them; this is important, given that open innovation as it was 
proposed by Chesbrough (2006) is proven to be a fundamental factor for innovation 
success for SMEs. Given that lack of partners for cooperation is a knowledge barrier, 
one can see that companies overcoming this impediment are the ones with a greater 
probability of succeeding in the innovation processes. 
 
Firms with patent applications also tend to be more successful in the appropriation 
phase. It seems like firms believing that there is a chance of selling their products are 
those who patent their inventions and try to protect themselves from competition. High 
and intermediate technology sectors seem to be negatively related to success in the 
appropriation phase; however, only medium high technology firms are statistically 
significant. Given that this type of firm tends to fail more in the innovative phase, we 
believe that this result for the appropriation phase is related to the fact that only a small 
proportion of firms reach this phase. 
 
Our results show that innovation barriers are not related to success in the appropriation 
process, that is, firms obtaining revenues from their inventions do not perceive barriers 
to innovation. We believe that this result confirms that companies succeeding at 
innovation are those that effectively overcome barriers, or those that never perceive 
those barriers to be an important issue. In that sense, our second hypothesis (H2) is 
proved: firms that successfully overcome barriers of all types are the likeliest to benefit 
from the innovation process. 
 
2.5.Discussion and concluding remarks 
We used the Teece (1986) framework to contribute to a holistic view of the relationship 
between the innovation process and barriers to innovation. Therefore, we divided the 
process of innovation into two separate stages: the invention phase, where an innovation 
is conceived; and the appropriation phase, where production and commercialization take 
place. Likewise, we divided each of those stages into two possible outcomes, failure and 
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success; our purpose was to understand which innovation barriers were related with this 
outcome at the firm level. 
 
With regard to the economic/financial barriers, we found that they are related to the 
initial phases of the innovation process, these results are aligned with Canepa & 
Stoneman (2002), Galia & Legros (2004), Savignac (2008), Mohnen et al. (2008), 
D'Este et al. (2012), and Blanchard et al. (2013). Our results show that 
economic/financial barriers are positively related to success in the invention phase, so 
firms successfully developing inventions tend to perceive more economic/financial 
barriers. We argue that this is not a counterfactual result in the context of our research, 
because firms perceive an innovation process as a costly one if they cannot bring 
inventions to market and profit from them. We also found that once the invention phase 
is passed, economic/financial–related barriers become irrelevant. Thus, financial 
problems seem to be relevant for firms in the beginning of the invention phase, so 
policy makers should be aware that subsidies for R&D&I are quite important for firms 
in those phases if they are looking to help firms to overcome economic/financial 
barriers. 
 
Concerning knowledge impediments, innovation projects are affected by them only at 
the initial stages of the invention phase, i.e., firms are prevented from finishing their 
invention projects because of skilled labor, cooperation, and information issues. As it 
was reported by Galia & Legros (2004) and Mohnen & Rosa (2001), the likelihood of 
project abandonment rises with the perception of knowledge barriers, and our results are 
aligned with these outcomes. We also found that once the invention phase is passed, 
knowledge impediments are irrelevant, so companies work hard at the beginning of 
their innovation process to find cooperation partners, market knowledge, and skilled 
labor. 
 
Market barriers seems to be the real impediment for firms regarding their capability to 
bring their inventions to market; we found that firms perceive those impediments as a 
real barrier only in the appropriation phase. Consequently, the uncertainty of demand 
for innovative products and services and market domination by well-established firms 
are big issues for SMEs that have already developed an invention. In that sense, in order 
to reduce the uncertainty of their projects, is imperative for firms to determine the 
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market possibilities for their inventions in the initial stages of the innovation process; 
this strategy can help them to reduce wasting scare resources. 
 
As we anticipated, our findings support the idea that in order to be successful in the 
appropriation phase, a firm has to overcome all barriers to innovation. The policy 
implications of this result are quite significant; the fact that actual policies tend to 
privilege the invention stage of the innovation process, mainly by subsidizing R&D&I, 
shows that this could be an incomplete approach. Policies can help overcome innovation 
barriers in the initial stages of innovation process; however, if those policies do not 
address the whole process and help firms to overcome all barriers even at the 
appropriation (commercialization) phase, it is less likely for a firm to be a winner in the 
innovation process and society can take advantage only of a minor set of innovation 
spillovers. 
 
The main result of this research is the differentiated impact of each barrier in the 
different stages of innovation process. Moreover, these differences can be easily 
rationalized with a dynamic approach to the innovation process, which in general terms 
can conclude that failure in the invention phase is typically related to 
economic/financial and knowledge barriers, and that after overcoming this phase, the 
relevant obstacle is typically market barriers. Finally, a successful innovation in all 
phases is characterized by the perception of no barriers. 
 
We proposed that firms can be winners as invention developers, but losers when taking 
those inventions to market. There is a long way from the development of an invention 
until revenues come through the door, and for companies’ interests, this last step is the 
most important, because it allows them to maximize their value, which is the main 
objective of private innovation ventures. As we found, market barriers seem to prevent 
firms from taking their inventions to market, so both policy makers and researchers 
need to expand their vision of barriers to innovation, including a dynamic approach to 
the innovation process, because without reaching the market, there is no such thing as 
innovation.  
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Chapter 3. Show me the money: pecking order 
and funding sources for innovative firms in 
Colombia 
3.1. Introduction 
The well-known theory of capital structure introduced for Modigliani & Miller (1958), 
proposed that the differences in capital sources used for firms to support their 
investment options have no impact in the value of firms. Basically, this theory suggests 
that in a market without failures, a firm will be indifferent to all the possible capital 
sources because the implicit cost for each of those sources will be equal; i.e., a firm 
could use cash flow, debt, equity or even venture capital, and the firm value will remain 
invariant. 
 
Generally, the MM theory has been rejected given that corporate and personal taxes 
affect a firm’s capital structure; in the same direction, the presence of information 
asymmetries, agency costs and adverse selection issues create differences among the 
cost of diverse firms’ funding sources; i.e., a firms’ decision about the use of one or 
another capital source could diminish or elevate the cost of that firms’ capital and 
therefore the value of the company (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers S. C., 2001). 
 
Given market failures, an important theory of capital structure based in the existence of 
those failures was proposed by Myers & Majluf (1984). This theory, so called “Pecking 
Order theory (POT)”, suggests that, in presence of information asymmetries and adverse 
selection issues between firm managers and outside investors, firms will prefer internal 
over external funding for their ventures. However, if internal resources are scarce, a 
firm would have to seek available external resources, i.e., debt or equity funding. 
Assuming that in most of the cases debt funding is cheaper than equity (caused by the 
agency costs raising the risk of equity funding), a firm will select debt financing over 
equity, therefore, when a firm need to finance a new investment, it will select funding 
sources in a hierarchical order, first internal sources, then debt and finally equity. 
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Although the pecking order theory was developed to understand the way firms finance 
their capital assets, some researchers have focused on the capital structure of firms’ 
intensive on R&D and innovation activities, or in the capital structure of high 
technology startups. Academic results seem to be contradictory; some found that firms 
finance their R&D and innovation activities as described in the pecking order theory 
(Manigart & Struyf, 1997; Giudici & Paleari, 2000; Ullah, et al., 2010; Bartolini, 2013; 
Hummel, et al., 2013), however, some others found evidence of a new form of pecking 
order (Aghion, et al., 2004; Schäfer, et al., 2004; Sau, 2007; Minola & Cassia, 2013). 
 
This new form of pecking order theory suggests that high tech, innovative or new 
technology-based firms, strongly use internal resources as a main financial source, just 
like in the usual pecking order theory; but, in respect to external resources, equity is 
preferred over debt because innovative firms cannot access debt markets. In that sense, 
some studies have shown that innovative firms tend to be credit-constrained because of 
moral hazard and adverse selection issues regarding their innovation activities (Freel, 
2007; Colombo & Grilli, 2007; Bartolini, 2013), and in some cases, debt markets are 
not willing to leverage innovative ventures because of the long-term focus of those 
endeavors, the high proportion of intangible assets used, and the uncertainty related 
with innovation profits. In those cases, a firm with a strong focus on innovation 
activities, or a high technology firm, will first use cash flow, then equity and debt as a 
final option (Aghion, et al., 2004; Schäfer, et al., 2004; Ullah, et al., 2010; Minola & 
Cassia, 2013; Bartolini, 2013) creating an altered form of pecking order theory (APOT). 
 
In most of the cases, the evidence about an APOT has been found in developed 
countries in which firms’ possibilities to raise equity are higher than in other types of 
countries with illiquid capital markets, or in countries in which the venture capital 
funding is strong compared with underdeveloped countries. In order to raise venture 
capital or equity from markets, firms need to be supported by a liquid and specialized 
capital market to undertake an Initial Public Offering (IPO), or to provide the necessary 
conditions for an exit strategy for early venture capitalists (Hall & Lerner, 2010). In that 
sense, research carried out in developed countries about the way innovative firms fund 
their ventures could be biased; it is possible that the financial behavior of firms in 
underdeveloped countries, with a small and illiquid equity markets, differ from those in 
developed countries. 
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This chapter attempted to reach two goals. First, to determine the main characteristics of 
firms’ funding innovation with internal resources, bank credit, equity, government 
grants, and other funding sources in Colombia, and second, to find the likelihood for 
Colombia’s firms to fund their R&D and innovation ventures with those same financial 
sources. We wanted to determine if in a developing country like Colombia, the POT or 
the APOT capital structures are followed by firms to finance their R&D and innovation 
activities. 
 
This is a novel approach to the financing of innovation in the sense that we are using 
only data from a national innovation survey (EDIT), in which questions about the way 
firms fund their R&D and innovation activities are included and, because we are trying 
to understand if R&D and innovation activities have a relevant role in the way firms use 
internal and external funding sources. Data includes firms from the manufacturing 
sector of Colombia from 2007—2008, and we use a multivariate probit approach to take 
into account the simultaneity of the innovation-funding phenomenon. 
 
This chapter is divided as follows. Section 3.2 includes a review of the pertinent 
literature and a small analysis of financial market development in Colombia and in the 
countries in which POT and APOT research has been developed; In Section 3.3, data, 
methodology, and expected results are developed. In Section 3.4, the results for the 
econometric model are described, and in Section 3.5, we developed the main 
conclusions of the report. 
3.2.Literature Review 
In 1958, Modigliani & Miller (MM) proposed that under equilibrium, given that agents 
have the possibility of perform arbitration, the value of a levered and an unlevered firm 
will be the same. According to them “… the cut-off point for investment in the firm (…) 
will be completely unaffected by the type of security used to finance their investment” 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958; p. 288). The logical conclusion to which this postulate 
takes us is that firms could raise money from any given financial source, the cost of 
capital for each firm will be the same, and all firms will have the same access to capital 
(Myers S. C., 2001). However, the fact that the MM thesis was framed in an equilibrium 
market without corporate taxes or agency costs, and with symmetric information, has 
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led to the rise of new capital structure theories in which imperfect market characteristics 
are included. 
 
Tradeoff theory (TOT) developed by Kraus & Litzemberg (1973) builds on MM 
propositions and includes the effect of corporate and personal taxes, but also bankruptcy 
costs; the TOT implicates that there is an optimal point of debt in which managers 
maximize the value of a levered firm. This can be done by maximizing the debt tax 
shield and minimizing the bankruptcy costs; over this point, if a firm acquires more 
debt, the value of the levered firm will be lower than the unlevered one. Even so, firms 
can choose not to pursue the maximizing point of value through debt, because 
sometimes they prefer to fund their ventures with other sources like cash flow or equity 
(Myers S. C., 2001). 
 
The Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Myers & Majluf, 1984), assumes a market in which 
there are information asymmetries between managers and investors. In this context, a 
manager’s decision to issue equity to finance a new venture provides information to 
investors about an overvalued company because managers only will issue shares when 
they can maximize the amount of cash received by the sell. Then, the direct effect of an 
equity issue in this context is the fall in stock prices. In the same framework, if a firm 
can use debt or equity to finance their ventures, an investor would understand that an 
equity issue is made by managers to transfer the risk to new stockholders
1
, therefore, 
investors will understand that equity acquisitions are not a good idea. As a result, the 
POT claims that firms will prefer internal rather than external sources of finance 
because there are no information asymmetries inside the firms; when external sources 
are needed, firms will prefer debt over equity, this is, the safest and cheapest finance 
sources first. 
 
At the same time, although the POT was developed to understand the way all types of 
firms fund their capital assets, some researchers have focused on the capital structure of 
intensive R&D and innovation firms to explore if, for those kinds of companies, the 
POT is supported. According to Hall & Lerner (2010), the market failures are stronger 
for innovative and high technology firms; in the first instance, innovation is riskier and 
                                                 
1
 Managers cannot transfer risk to lenders given that lender rights are prior to equity holders rights. 
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longer-term compared with traditional capital investments. Consequently, the profit rate 
required by external investors is higher than in other types of endeavors because of the 
uncertainty of the projects. In that sense, one can expect innovative firms to be highly 
financed by internal funding. 
 
At the same time, when innovative firms have to rely on external funding, asymmetric 
information is a major issue for those companies; the fact that firms have better 
information about the real possibilities of their ventures elevates the cost of external 
funding. To solve this issue, one might think that full revelation of the innovative 
venture could be a solution, but in that case, the innovator could be imitated by its 
competition (Hall & Lerner, 2010). Simultaneously, innovative companies have lower 
rates of collateral assets to support debt, i.e., the main objective of those firms is to 
create knowledge embedded in new products or services; the asset in which firms 
support the knowledge creation is human capital that cannot be used as debt collateral, 
and therefore, it’s expected for innovative companies to be credit-constrained because 
they do not have collateral assets (Freel, 2007; Colombo & Grilli, 2007). 
 
For these reasons, it was expected that innovative firms tend to prefer internal, over 
external sources to finance their activities. Nevertheless, innovation activities are costly 
and therefore, firms tend to raise money externally. However, given that high 
technology and innovative firms could be credit constrained, some firms will prefer to 
finance their projects with equity rather than debt, giving room to an altered form of 
pecking order (APOT), in which firms prefer internal over external sources, but equity 
over debt financing
2
. In this area, research results seem to be contradictory. Some 
research found that firms finance their R&D and innovation activities as described in 
the POT (Manigart & Struyf, 1997; Giudici & Paleari, 2000; Ullah, et al., 2010; 
Bartolini, 2013; Hummel, et al., 2013), while others found evidence of an APOT for 
firm’s intensive on R&D and innovation activities (Aghion, et al., 2004; Schäfer, et al., 
2004; Audretsch & Lehmann, 2004; Ullah, et al., 2010; Minola & Cassia, 2013).  
 
For instance, Manigart & Struyf (1997), working with their own developed survey for 
18 Belgium firms, found out that there’s evidence of a capital structure under the POT 
                                                 
2
 For a complete description of the Altered Pecking Order phenomena, review the work of Sau (2007). 
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parameters for high technology companies, and that firms tend to have lower 
proportions of collateral assets in which credit rationing will appear; they worked also 
with government as a source of finance, finding out that there was little effect of the 
latter over capital structure of high technology firms. Giudici & Paleari (2000) used data 
from 46 high technology Italian SMEs, and by means of a direct survey they concluded 
that those firms had a capital structure like POT predicts. Also for Italy, Bartolini 
(2013) used a data combination between the Community Innovation Survey (CIS3
3
) and 
an administrative survey for 2.591 firms between 1.996 and 2.003, and determined that 
firms follow the POT capital structure characteristics. They also found that the way 
firms fund innovation depends mainly on specific characteristics such as size, age, 
localization, or innovative behavior. Ullah, et al., (2010) found out that in the United 
Kingdom, firms belonging in the software industry followed the POT capital structure, 
and that some firm characteristics such as industrial belonging could define the way 
firms fund their ventures. Lastly, Hummel, et al., (2013) used data from 171 surveyed 
SMEs from Germany. They found out that the innovativeness degree of a firm had an 
impact in the way companies are financed. Also, they confirmed that for that group of 
firms, their capital structures were like the POT predicts.  
 
On the side of the APOT for innovative and high technology firms, Aghion, et al., 
(2004) used 900 firms from the London Stock Exchange and found that intensive R&D 
firms have different financial behaviors than other types of companies, because those 
firms tend to use more debt than firms with low levels of R&D expenditures. In the 
same direction, they found that firms with the highest levels of R&D expenditure are 
likeliest to fund ventures with equity than with debt, confirming the existence of an 
APOT. At the same time, Audretsch & Lehmann (2004), using data from 341 German 
traded firms, found out that growing high technology firms tended to privilege external 
equity over external debt, and that those sources were not complementary, but were 
substitutes. 
 
In the case of Ullah, et al., (2010), although they found that in the United Kingdom the 
software firms followed a POT pattern, they used data for 42 software firms and 41 
biotech firms, showing that biotech firms, contrary to software firms, have an APOT 
                                                 
3
 For a complete description of the Community Innovation Survey, review Arundel, et al. (2008) 
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capital structure, concluding that some industry characteristics could influence the way 
innovative firms fund their ventures. In the same sense, Minola & Cassia (2013), 
working with data from 5,000 firms from the Kauffman Firm Survey, found out that the 
most innovative firms tended to have an APOT capital structure pattern. However, they 
also found that firm characteristics tended to define the way they funded R&D 
expenditures. In the case of Germany, although they were not working within the APOT 
framework, Schäfer, et al. (2004) used data from 903 firms involved in government 
innovation programs and found out that firms willing to finance their ventures with 
equity sources are the riskier ones, suggesting that when the expected return is high, 
firms and investors are willing to use shares to finance their projects in detriment of 
debt funding sources.  
 
One major issue about some of this research about capital structure, especially the ones 
supporting an APOT capital structure for innovative firms that focus on U.S., U.K., and 
German firms, in part because the availability of data for those countries, is well-
known; that financial markets in those countries are well-suited for venture capital and 
equity funding (Hall & Lerner, 2010; Kerr & Nanda, 2015). Moreover, in the case of 
Aghion, et al., (2004), and Audretsch & Lehmann, (2004) research, they used publicly 
traded firms in the United Kingdom and Germany, however, those kinds of firms are an 
exception, especially for underdeveloped countries. Capital markets in those countries 
are illiquid, have a low transactional volume, and have a small set of traded firms.  
 
In Table 3 it is possible to appreciate those differences for OECD members, Colombia, 
Belgium, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom and United States. Between 2000 and 2009 
we used that particular set of countries given these are the ones related to the literature 
reviewed in past paragraphs, and we add the OECD members to develop a comparison 
context. With Table 3 data it is possible to appreciate that Colombia as an 
underdeveloped country and has an embryonic capital market. Capitalization of listed 
domestic firms is low compared with OECD, and the United Kingdom and the United 
States. For the years 2008 and 2009, Colombia had higher market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP than Belgium, Italy and Germany. However, this could be a 
consequence of the subprime crisis in developed countries in which Colombia’s market 
grew as a consequence of the inflows of international investment. Nevertheless, in 2005 
and 2006 the market capitalization of Colombia was low in comparison with those 
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countries. The number of listed firms also showed that Colombia’s market is small in 
comparison with those of developed countries; for instance, Colombia has two firms per 
million inhabitants listed in year 2000 compared with 35 in the United Kingdom. Lastly, 
the total value of stocks traded in the market as a percentage of the GDP was 9.6% in 
Colombia’s best year against 220,7% of the United States in the same year. The point 
here is that if the development level of capital markets is related to the finance sources 
that innovative firms can raise, we expected equity funding for innovative companies to 
be restricted given the low liquidity and volume of their capital markets. 
Table 3. Capital markets of selected countries and the OCDE 
Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (% of GDP) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
OECD 108.4 94.2 75.8 89.6 95.0 99.3 112.4 110.4 58.1 81.0 
Colombia      34.5 34.6 49.2 36.0 60.1 
Belgium 76.7 69.7 49.3 54.4 73.7 74.5 96.7 81.7 32.2 53.6 
Italy 67.3 45.4 37.7 39.2 43.9 43.1 52.8 48.7 21.8 30.0 
Germany 65.1 54.9 33.0 43.1 42.4 42.0 54.5 61.2 29.6 37.8 
U. Kingdom 165.7 139.9 110.5 124.8 122.5 126.4 146.1 129.5 66.9 
 U. States 146.9 131.7 100.7 123.9 133.0 129.8 141.2 137.6 78.7 104.6 
Listed domestic companies, per million inhabitants 
OECD 20.8 20.7 20.0 21.2 18.5 18.5 21.6 21.7 21.0 20.0 
Colombia 1.8 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 
Belgium 25.9 26.7 24.8 24.1 22.6 21.2 19.4 16.5 16.0 15.3 
Italy 5.2 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.0 4.9 
Germany 9.0 9.1 8.7 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.0 9.3 9.0 8.6 
U. Kingdom 41.2 41.2 40.5 38.7 41.4 45.6 47.9 42.2 39.1 35.0 
U. States 24.5 21.7 19.8 18.3 17.8 17.4 17.2 17.0 15.3 14.3 
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 
OECD 160.4 118.7 91.7 83.3 91.5 112.6 134.3 177.3 166.3 127.5 
Colombia 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.8 6.5 9.6 8.3 7.4 8.5 
Belgium 16.2 15.9 14.7 13.0 20.3 27.5 33.0 49.1 36.8 25.4 
Italy 86.7 51.6 45.5 46.7 50.1 56.9 62.2 100.5 57.9 42.4 
Germany 93.7 66.7 41.9 40.6 41.9 45.0 65.0 94.6 111.7 52.3 
U. Kingdom 117.9 123.3 62.3 64.1 70.6 71.5 106.8 132.9 97.9 121.3 
U. States 289.6 196.6 155.3 139.4 155.6 197.0 220.7 296.0 321.0 237.9 
Source: World Bank Databank, author’s calculations 
At the same time, research in which publicly traded firms were used, tended to use a 
small set of surveyed firms, contrary, when CIS data were used, a great number of firms 
can be used. For instance, Bartolini (2013) used data for 2.591 firms based on the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for Italy, this survey had access to a more 
comprehensive set of data about innovation activities, and not only the R&D firm 
expenditures, which is the most common innovation proxy used on research with 
publicly listed companies. 
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Simultaneously, research using publicly listed firms tend to use a complete set of 
financial reports of these companies, including profits and losses, cash flows, and 
balance sheets statements. This because researchers do not have access to data about the 
financial behavior of firms related directly with R&D and innovation activities. The 
problem with the use of full financial reports is that in a majority of cases, researchers 
only can make assumptions about the financial behavior of firms regarding innovation 
activities, i.e., financial reports can only give us information about the amounts of debt 
and equity in a general view, including innovative and non-innovative activities. 
However, innovation usually does not follow the logic of firms’ general activities; so, 
one can expect that the financial behaviors of firms regarding innovation would be 
slightly different from the financial reports data. In that case, it could be interesting to 
have data about the way firms finance their innovation activities and relate that 
information with the innovative behavior of companies. Unfortunately, it is not common 
to find this information jointly, because the innovation surveys following the Oslo 
manual (Mortensen & Bloch, 2005), do not include questions about the financial 
behaviors of firms. 
 
The present research is a novel effort in the sense that we used data from Colombia’s 
innovation survey, in contrast with other national innovation surveys, and combined 
questions about innovative behavior and the sources of funding to develop innovation 
ventures. As we know, only one effort has been developed to use this type of 
information to determine the way firms finance their innovation activities. It was 
developed by Sierra, et al. (2009) for the Bogotá (Colombia) region; in this research, 
they found that internal resources and national banking, followed by government grants, 
were the main funding sources for innovative firms. However, the inexistence of an 
equity source in data does not allow them to probe the existence of a POT or an APOT 
capital structure. In this research, we tried to determine, in the first instance, if the main 
characteristics of firms using the different funding sources, could define the way that 
firms finance their innovative efforts, and second, corroborate if Colombia’s innovative 
firms followed the POT or APOT capital structure.  
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3.3.Data, methodology and expected results 
The Colombia´s EDIT
4
 survey followed the general guidelines of the European 
Community Innovation Survey, but has a special chapter in which firms are asked about 
the funding sources used for innovation activities. Among the sources the EDIT  
includes are internal resources, bank debt, equity, government funds and others
5
. Given 
that in the reviewed literature one cannot find a source of information including data 
about innovation activities by one side, and data about the way firms finance those 
innovation activities on the other, the EDIT survey is a special case that can be reviewed 
to understand the way firms’ funds innovation related activities, specially, if one is 
interested in the behaviors of innovation companies in underdeveloped countries. 
 
We used the 2007–2008 EDIT results, that includes 7.683 manufacture firms of which 
67.3% are firms between 1 and less than 50 employees, 25.1% are firms with at least 50 
and 250 employees and 7.6% are firms with more than 250 workers. However, we only 
used companies with positive expenditures on R&D and innovation, and restricting data 
of firms with less than 10 employees and therefore, our final sample is 2.621 firms. In 
that sample, 16.3% are big firms with more than 250 employees, 39.9% have between 
50 and 250 employees, and 43.9% have between 10 and 50 workers.  
 
Firms in our sample were asked about the origin of funds used to support R&D and 
innovation activities, therefore, we characterized the innovation funding sources for the 
sample. We used dummy (1;0) variables to identify when a firm was using or not using 
a specific funding source. As we can see in Table 4, internal funding was the most used 
resource in all firms followed by banks. Specially drew our attention the fact that equity 
is not the third most used source of funding; government grants and other sources 
represented 3.1% and 3.2% against 2.0% of equity. Medium size firms were the ones 
with the most frequent use of equity, however, for this type of firms, the sum of 
government grants, and other sources represented almost 3 times the frequency of use 
against equity. Large companies were the ones that use most frequently internal 
resources, banks, and government grants. 
Table 4. Funding source used by firm size 
                                                 
4
 Manufacture industry survey for technologic development and innovation (Encuesta de desarrollo e 
innovación tecnológica de la industria manufacturera) 
5
 Includes cooperation, economic group, and other nonrelated firms funding. 
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Size # Internal funds Banks Equity Public grants Others* 
All Sample 2,621 87.8% 29.7% 2.0% 3.1% 3.2% 
Small >10; <50 1,150 87.5% 26.8% 1.8% 1.7% 2.9% 
Medium >=50; <=250 1,045 87.5% 31.7% 2.4% 3.4% 3.8% 
SMEs (>10; <=250) 2,195 87.5% 29.1% 2.1% 2.5% 3.3% 
Large (>250) 426 89.7% 32.4% 1.4% 6.1% 2.3% 
* Includes international cooperation, economic group and other non-related firms 
Source: EDIT 2007-2008. 
In Table 5 the tetrachoric correlations for the dummy variables of funding sources are 
shown; it seems evident that decisions for taking one type or other of a funding source 
are correlated, e.g., the use of internal sources is negatively correlated with banks, 
equity, public grants, and other type of funds. Bank funding is positively correlated with 
equity and other sources, etc. In this case, one can argue that this is a logical outcome; 
firms do not use an exclusive funding source, but a combination of them, so a specific 
company can use internal funding, banks, and government funding at the same time, 
and all the possible combinations of those sources. In the same sense, a firm’s decision 
to use one of the funding sources can be affected by the likelihood they have access to 
another funding source. In that direction, we also performed a multivariate test for 
covariance to determine if funding sources are jointly decided by firms, specifically, we 
used a likelihood ratio test to review if the variance-covariance matrix is a diagonal one 
or if the matrix contains significant covariance among variables. The test results showed 
that funding sources are strongly related among them
6
. This result had implications in 
the econometric strategy used for our research, because if the funding sources fluctuated 
jointly it was necessary to use a multivariate approach. Therefore, and given that we are 
using dummy variables for funding sources, we decided to use a multivariate probit 
model following the strategy of Cappellari & Jenkins (2003). 
Table 5. Tetrachoric correlations of funding sources 
 
internal bank equity public 
Other 
sources** 
internal 1 
    bank -0.7743* 1 
   equity -0.5505* 0.1813* 1 
  public -0.1870* 
  
1 
 Other sources** -0.3006* 0.1425* 
 
0.2389* 1 
* Only correlation with 5% significance level are shown. 
**Includes international cooperation, economic group and other non-related firms. 
Source: EDIT 2007-2008. 
 
                                                 
6
 The adjusted LR chi
2
 was 754.02 and prob> chi
2
=0.0000 
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The variables used in the model are summarized in Table 6. We included five dependent 
dummy variables to cover all the funding sources used by firms in order to finance their 
R&D and innovation activities. The independent variables included can be divided into 
two groups, the expense vector (Xj) and the firm characteristics vector (Zj). The expense 
vector includes four variables counting for 1 if the firm had an expense of that type 
(internal or external R&D, intangible innovation, tangible innovation, and 
biotechnology expenses), and 0 otherwise. The firm characteristics vector included a log 
of the firm size, a dummy variable for capital origin of firms, a dummy variable 
counting if a firm is innovative or not, a variable equal 1 if firms have strong financial 
barriers perception, a sectorial dummy variable for firms of high technology industry () 
and lastly, a proxy variable for innovative revenues. 
 
Table 6. Variables used in the multivariate probit models 
Variable name Type Description 
internal Binary 
1 if firm is using internal funding to support its R&D and innovation 
expenditure, 0 otherwise. 
Bank Binary 
1 if firm is using bank funding to support its R&D and innovation 
expenditure, 0 otherwise. 
equity Binary 
1 if firm is using equity funding to support its R&D and innovation 
expenditure, 0 otherwise. 
public Binary 
1 if firm is using government grants to support its R&D and innovation 
expenditure, 0 otherwise. 
other_sources* Binary 
1 if firm is using international cooperation, economic group or other firms 
funding to support its R&D and innovation expenditure, 0 otherwise. 
randd Binary 1 if firm has any expenses on internal or external R&D, 0 otherwise 
intangible Binary 
1 if firm has any innovation expenses on intangible assets (Innovation 
marketing, technology transfer, technical assistance and consulting, 
industrial design or education and training), 0 otherwise 
tangible Binary 
1 if firm has any innovation expenses on tangible assets (Machinery and 
equipment, Information and telecommunication technologies), 0 otherwise 
biotech Binary 
1 if firm expend any amount of money on biotechnology activities, 0 
otherwise 
Size Log Is the log of average number of employees of firms between 2007 and 2008 
foreign Binary 1 if firm has international origin, 0 otherwise 
innovative Binary 
1 if in the past two years’ companies developed any product, services or 
process innovation new to the firm or new to the market, 0 otherwise 
fin_barr Binary 
1 if firm perceived that it has difficulties to access internal or external 
funding sources or if firm perceived that innovation is not profitable, 0 
otherwise. We categorize as 1 only firms reporting a strong perception of 
impediments 
hightech Binary 1 if firm belongs to a high technology sector, 0 otherwise (see Appendix A) 
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Variable name Type Description 
rev_prox Percentage 
Proxy of the innovation revenues. Given that innovative revenues data is 
not available into the survey, if a firm respond that innovative products and 
services sales are 25% of their national sales and 10% of their international 
sales, the proxy variable will take the 0,35 value. It is a proxy in the sense 
that account for the sum of national and international innovation revenues 
percentage; a firm in which all their revenues came from innovative 
products and services will take the value of 2, but if a firm have no 
innovation revenues in the country or overseas, the proxy will take the 0 
value. 
* Includes international cooperation, economic group and other non-related firms. 
 
The multivariate probit model (Green, 2003) could be described as: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖
∗ > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
in which i are the five different funding sources described in Table 6, and j are each one 
of the firms included in our sample with, 
𝑌1
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝛽1,1 + 𝑍𝑗𝛽2,1 + 𝜀1 
𝑌2
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝛽1,2 + 𝑍𝑗𝛽2,2 + 𝜀2 
𝑌3
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝛽1,3 + 𝑍𝑗𝛽2,3 + 𝜀3 
𝑌4
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝛽1,4 + 𝑍𝑗𝛽2,4 + 𝜀4 
𝑌5
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝛽1,5 + 𝑍𝑗𝛽2,5 + 𝜀5 
𝑌𝑖
∗, 𝑋𝑗 is the expense vector, and 𝑍𝑗 is the firm characteristics vector. And with, 
[
 
 
 
 
𝜀1
𝜀2
𝜀3
𝜀4
𝜀5]
 
 
 
 
|𝑋, 𝑍 ∽ 𝑁
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0
0
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0
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1 𝜌1,2 𝜌1,3 𝜌1,4 𝜌1,5
𝜌1,2 1 𝜌2,3 𝜌2,4 𝜌2,5
𝜌1,3 𝜌2,3 1 𝜌3,4 𝜌3,5
𝜌1,4 𝜌2,4 𝜌3,4 1 𝜌4,5
𝜌1,5 𝜌2,5 𝜌3,5 𝜌4,5 1 ]
 
 
 
 
 
)
 
 
 
Along with the reviewed literature (Aghion, et al., 2004; Ullah, et al., 2010; Bartolini, 
2013; Hummel, et al., 2013; Minola & Cassia, 2013), we expected that the firm 
characteristic vector ( 𝑍𝑖 ), determines the way firms use funding sources, i.e., 
characteristics like size, innovation results, capital origin, industry, revenues from 
innovation, and the perception of financial barriers
7
 influence the use of innovation 
financial sources. In the same direction, we expect the expense vector (𝑋𝑖) to be related 
with the funding sources used by firms, i.e., if a firm made an expenditure on R&D, 
                                                 
7
 Innovation surveys based on the Oslo manual generally include a chapter in which firms are asked about 
their perception of some impediments with regard to innovation activities. Among the impediments asked 
to firms in Colombia’s innovation survey it can be found the perception to financial barriers including i- 
difficulty to access internal financial funds; ii- difficulty to access external financial funds and iii- 
innovation is not profitable. 
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biotechnology, tangible or intangible innovation, this could determine the access to 
those financial sources, Manigart & Struyf (1997). As we pointed in the literature 
review, Aghion, et al., 2004, found that intensive R&D firms tended to behave 
differently from those non-R&D intensive firms regarding their funding sources. 
 
To determinate if innovative firms tended to follow a POT or an APOT capital 
structure, after the multivariate probit regression, we determined the marginal predicted 
probabilities of firms to use internal, bank, equity, public grants, or other sources using 
the Cappellari & Jenkins (2003) strategy. We expected that in Colombia, firms tended 
to follow the POT structure, given that in underdeveloped countries firms do not have 
easy access to equity markets, as posted in the literature review and shown in Table 3. 
So, we expected that firms tended to use internal sources in the highest proportion, 
followed by banks, and then equity sources; at the same time, related with the use of 
public grants and other sources, we predicted probabilities would be lower than internal 
and bank sources. We were also interested in changing the subsamples of firms to 
determinate if some sets of firms had different capital structures or had the highest 
likelihoods of being financed by some of the funding sources. Consequently, we ran the 
same econometric approach for SME’s, big firms, innovative companies, and firms with 
lower and higher R&D and innovation expenditures. 
3.4.Results 
3.4.1. Results from the full sample 
In Table 7 we present the results of the multivariate probit model in which we included 
all the 2.621 firms from the sample. These results show that firms with positive 
expenditure in R&D (randd) and firms with expenditures on intangible assets 
(intangible) tend to finance innovation ventures mostly with their own resources. As it 
was shown in the literature review section, firms facing higher information 
asymmetries, tended to use internal resources because the external financing is costly 
for them. In the cases of intensive R&D firms, the long-term natures of their projects 
and the uncertainty of future profits elevates the cost of external funding. In the same 
direction, firms strongly investing on intangible assets cannot provide guarantees of 
future payments in the case of bank access, making companies rely mainly on internal 
funds. 
Table 7. MPR, funding sources of R&D&i+ 
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Variable internal bank equity public other sources 
Randd 0.276** 0.056 -0.06 0.229* 0.144 
Biotech -0.046 -0.116 0.205 -0.124 -0.284 
intangible 0.332*** 0.006 0.298* 0.273* 0.092 
tangible -0.217 1.024*** 0.011 0.176 -0.002 
Size -0.038 0.089*** -0.016 0.172*** -0.006 
Foreign 0.203 -0.327*** -0.268 -0.116 0.092 
innovative -0.075 0.448*** 0.207 -0.112 -0.12 
fin_barr -0.115 0.238*** 0.181 0.075 0.063 
hightech 0.353 -0.382* -0.27 0.09 -0.053 
rev_prox -0.027 0.021 0.062 -0.019 0.037 
  _cons 1.511*** -2.466*** -2.647*** -2.941*** -1.921*** 
Predicted Prob.         0.8802          0.2989          0.0200          0.0309             0.0314  
N 2621 
Prob>Chi 2 0.0000 
+Multivariate Probit regression. Includes all the sample. Firms with more than 10 employees and with 
R&D&i expenses in the 2007-2008 period 
*P. <0.05; **P.<0.01; ***P.<0.001 
 
We were expecting that firm characteristics were determinant to the use of internal 
funds. For example, small firms tended to be riskier than bigger firm, and therefore, we 
expected a negative statistical relationship between internal funds and size. However, 
size, innovation revenues, or innovation, seem to be irrelevant in the case of internal 
sources. It appears that firms’ characteristics do not determine the use of internal funds 
after being controlled by the type of spending made by firms. 
 
Bank funding is the contrary case. The type of spending relevant for this type of funding 
are tangible assets (equipment and machinery, etc.), therefore in the case of debt, the 
collateral capability of firms is fundamental. Related with the firm characteristics 
vector, bigger firms tended to use more banks, maybe this caused their expected cash 
flows and amount of total assets to allow those firms to have easier access to bank 
funding. In the same direction, innovative firms tend to have more access to bank 
funding, a possible explanation is that these firms could prove to banks their projects 
could be successfully finished, or because those types of firms are more active in the 
search for external funding. However, this aspect has to be researched deeply in the 
future. 
 
At the same time, firms facing financial barriers, i.e., perceiving a strong difficulty 
finding internal or external funding and tended to have more banking access; although 
this result seems to be counterintuitive, there is a strong background of literature 
supporting that innovation, and barriers can be viewed as firms’ experience measure on 
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innovative markets (Arundel, 1997; Baldwin & Lin, 2002; Iammarino, et al., 2007; 
D'Este, et al., 2012), so this result can be viewed as if companies having strong financial 
barriers were the ones having to make higher efforts to access bank loans because they 
know innovative and financial markets better than other firms. 
 
Firms belonging to high technology industries seemed to be credit constrained. i.e., 
there was a negative relationship between those industries and bank funding. As it was 
established by Giudici & Paleari, (2000), it seemed like banks restrict the amount of 
loans to high technology firms because bank ability to evaluate those kinds of ventures 
is poor; this is, the market imperfections are stronger for firms in high technology 
industries.  
 
At the same time, foreign capital firms seemed to be negative related with bank funding; 
the fact that these types of firms could have access to the financial arm of their 
international headquarters, possibly decreased the need to access bank loans. In this 
point, we tried to run a regression separating group funding sources form an “other 
sources” variable, trying to determinate if foreign firms used group sources in higher 
proportions. However, the result was not significant. 
 
The use of equity sources is related with intangible assets expenditure. As we posted 
before, firms with intangible expenses were also prone to use internal sources, and firms 
with tangible assets were likely to use banks. The fact that firms with intangible assets 
expenditure used more internal and equity sources could be a clue for a possible 
existence of an APOT structure for these types of firms. However, as we can see with 
the marginal probabilities, this is not the case. 
 
Results for public grant funding show that in Colombia’s case, this type of funding is 
not closing the gap between SMEs and big companies; bigger firms, that in theory are 
the ones confronting less market failures, are likeliest to use government grants. At the 
same time, firms investing in R&D and intangible assets are likeliest to use public 
grants. In the case of other sources, we found that no independent variables were 
significantly related with those sources. 
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To understand if innovative firms in Colombia follow a POT or an APOT capital 
structure, we calculated marginal probabilities for each of the dependent variables of the 
multivariate model. As seen in Table 7, a firm likelihood of using internal funding is 
88%, followed by banks with 30%, other sources 3.1%, public grants 3.1%, and finally 
equity funding with a 2.0% probability. Firms tended to follow a POT capital structure 
with little likelihood of using equity sources. Firms use internal resources in higher 
proportion mainly because the market failures elevate the external cost of funding; then, 
if internal resources are not enough to finance their ventures, firms have to look for 
external resources. In that direction, bank funding is important for firms even when it is 
costly, and public and other sources are more likely to be used than equity. Our 
explanation for the latter result is that in underdeveloped countries the liquidity and 
access to capital markets are very poor. In that sense, companies could prefer to use 
equity over banks in some cases and present an APOT capital structure. However, the 
fact that the capital market is illiquid and small (Table 3), does not allow firms to access 
equity funds, leaving companies with a POT capital structure in which public and other 
funding sources are better suited than equity sources for innovative ventures. 
 
3.4.2. Sub-sample results 
In order to perform a robustness check, we decided to divide the sample into a number 
of subsamples. In the same sense, we were interested in determining if some sets of 
firms have different probabilities to be funded by diverse financial sources included in 
the survey. 
 
First, we used a subsample of SMEs, and the results remained unchanged, as can be 
seen in Table 8, a firm likelihood to be financed with internal funds, banks, equity, and 
other sources remained practically unaltered. However, there was a slight difference in 
the probability of being financed by public grants from 3.1% for the complete sample 
against 2.5% of SMEs, so it can be seen that small firms were, to some extent, 
constrained by public grants. We also used a subsample for big firms, however it cannot 
be said that regression coefficients were different from zero. For this reason, the 
marginal probabilities had to be interpreted with caution; still, the fact that likelihood of 
big firms being funded with public grants was more than two times the likelihood of 
small firms, could reinforce the fact that SMEs had limited access to public funds. In the 
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same direction with a probability of 33%, it seems that big firms had more access to 
bank funding against 30% of SMEs. 
Table 8. MPR for SMEs and big firms+ 
Sub-sample of SME Firms (10-249 employees) 
Variables internal bank equity public other sources 
randd 0.259** 0.106 0.047 0.338** 0.225 
biotech 0.006 -0.149 0.104 -0.319 -0.244 
intangible 0.303*** 0.05 0.336* 0.312* 0.14 
tangible -0.197 1.038*** 0.049 0.292 0.071 
size -0.029 0.087* -0.021 0.184* 0.072 
foreign 0.284 -0.434*** -0.29 -0.371 0.191 
innovative -0.094 0.551*** 0.225 -0.104 -0.143 
fin_barr -0.077 0.225*** 0.215 0.107 0.064 
hightech 0.29 -0.426** -0.195 0.092 -0.008 
rev_prox -0.025 0.021 0.043 -0.038 0.026 
_cons 1.444*** -2.563*** -2.660*** -3.106*** -2.284*** 
Predicted Prob. 0.8771 0.2952 0.0217 0.0250 0.0332 
N 2,195 
Prob>Chi 2 0.0000 
 Sub-sample of big firms (250 or more employees) 
Variables internal bank equity public other sources 
randd 0.274 -0.099 -0.634 0.000 -0.109 
biotech -0.382 -0.017 0.822* 0.262 -3.473 
intangible 0.347 -0.12 -0.066 0.079 -0.251 
tangible -0.115 0.880* 3.688 0.016 -0.647 
size -0.199 0.094 0.36 0.108 0.19 
foreign 0.116 -0.297* -0.213 0.076 -0.216 
innovative -0.156 0.244 2.781 -0.153 3.082 
fin_barr -0.284 0.291* -0.011 -0.046 0.016 
hightech 3.882 -0.369 -3.692 0.059 -4.149 
rev_prox -0.014 0.021 0.153 0.054 0.089 
_cons 2.674** -2.111** -11.339 -2.343* -5.532 
Predicted Prob. 0.8979 0.3297 0.0139 0.0613 0.0256 
N 426 
Prob>Chi 2 0.3996 
+Multivariate Probit regression. Includes firms with R&D&i expenses in the 2007-2008 period*P. <0.05; 
**P.<0.01; ***P.<0.001 
We also performed a regression for the subsample of innovative firms (Table 9). The 
results were quite similar, however, the bank access to innovative firms was slightly 
higher than the total sample. The probability for innovative firms to be funded by banks 
was 31.5% against 30% of the complete sample.  
Table 9. MPR for innovative firms
+ 
Variables internal bank equity public other sources 
randd 0.308*** 0.053 -0.104 0.259* 0.14 
biotech -0.025 -0.117 0.206 -0.135 -0.312 
intangible 0.355*** -0.008 0.271* 0.243* 0.106 
tangible -0.128 1.031*** -0.096 0.143 0.021 
size -0.021 0.065** -0.02 0.166*** -0.016 
foreign 0.163 -0.324*** -0.22 -0.155 0.154 
innovative 
     
fin_barr -0.105 0.242*** 0.17 0.05 0.069 
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hightech 0.317 -0.420** -0.31 0.093 -0.082 
rev_prox -0.028 0.022 0.064 -0.017 0.037 
_cons 1.258*** -1.914*** -2.296*** -2.973*** -2.040*** 
Predicted Prob. 0.8771 0.3147 0.0208 0.0303 0.0313 
N 2,413 
Prob>Chi 2 0.0000 
+Multivariate Probit regression. Includes firms with R&D&i expenses in the 2007-2008 period 
*P. <0.05; **P.<0.01; ***P.<0.001 
 
We executed the same multivariate probit regression in the case of firms using tangible 
and intangible assets. Our results are aligned with those found by Manigart & Struyf 
(1997), and can be seen in Table 10. In the case of firms with tangible assets, results for 
the independent variables were the same as in the case of the complete sample, 
however, the probability of bank access was slightly higher for firms expending in 
tangible assets with a 32% against 30% of the full sample. It seems that firms with more 
tangible assets, and therefore more collateral, could have more access to bank loans. In 
the case of intangible assets, the results showed that there was a higher probability for 
firms to use internal funds with a 92% against the 88% of the complete sample, or the 
87% of the firms with tangible expenses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. MPR. Firms with tangible and intangible assets expenses+ 
Firms with tangible assets expenses (tangible=1) 
Variables internal bank equity Public other sources 
randd 0.288** 0.037 -0.134 0.244* 0.177 
biotech -0.033 -0.087 0.218 -0.112 -0.277 
intangible 0.344*** 0.016 0.354** 0.245* 0.064 
tangible 
     
size -0.033 0.076** -0.035 0.169*** -0.007 
foreign 0.244 -0.330*** -0.361 -0.141 0.042 
innovative -0.017 0.497*** 0.089 -0.158 -0.051 
fin_barr -0.109 0.233*** 0.181 0.07 0.02 
hightech 0.283 -0.343* -0.261 0.011 -0.021 
rev_prox -0.029 0.02 0.06 -0.006 0.026 
_cons 1.213*** -1.426*** -2.447*** -2.727*** -1.922*** 
Predicted Prob. 0.8749  0.3235  0.0201          0.0309             0.0311  
N 2,388 
Prob>Chi 2 0.0000 
      Firms with intangible assets expenses (intangible=1) 
 internal bank equity Public other sources 
randd 0.243* 0.106 -0.254 0.261* 0.298* 
biotech -0.05 -0.035 0.303 -0.036 -0.305 
intangible 
     
tangible -0.176 1.078*** 0.299 0.188 -0.143 
size -0.017 0.061 -0.07 0.112* -0.086 
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foreign 0.117 -0.392** -0.241 -0.026 0.231 
innovative 0.217 0.390* -0.245 -0.164 -0.026 
fin_barr -0.108 0.280*** 0.119 0.028 0.16 
hightech 0.291 -0.366 -0.201 0.042 -0.181 
rev_prox -0.061* 0.042* 0.147** -0.003 0.066 
_cons 1.576*** -2.448*** -2.119*** -2.388*** -1.675*** 
Predicted Prob. 0.9204 0.3016 0.0268 0.0430 0.0379 
N 1,350 
Prob>Chi 2 0.0000 
+Multivariate Probit regression. Includes firms with R&D&i expenses in the 2007-2008 period 
*P. <0.05; **P.<0.01; ***P.<0.001 
 
Finally, we divided the sample between firms with higher and lower amounts of R&D expenses; in 
expenses; in this case, we used the log of the expense in R&D by employee to divide the sample in 
the sample in the above-average firms and below-average firms. The results can be seen in  
 
 
 
Table 11. Firms with higher expenditure in R&D seemed to have a lower likelihood of 
using internal funds than in the complete sample. At the same time, the probability of 
those firms to use bank funding increased in large proportion with 41% against 30% of 
the complete sample.  
 
 
 
 
Table 11. MPR. Firms above and below the R&D expenditure average+1. 
Firms above the average of R&D expenditure 
Variables internal bank equity public other sources 
randd 0.348** 0.03 -0.311 0.14 0.029 
biotech 0.02 -0.281** 0.088 -0.229 -0.319 
intangible 0.471*** -0.182* 0.442* 0.227 -0.076 
tangible 0.065 0.876*** 0.034 0.051 -0.306 
size 0.014 0.026 -0.072 0.155** -0.087 
foreign 0.152 -0.373*** -0.014 -0.153 0.199 
innovative -0.151 0.279 3.266 0.052 0.037 
fin_barr -0.195* 0.298*** 0.023 0.102 0.05 
hightech 0.336 -0.537** -3.569 0.125 -0.034 
rev_prox -0.025 0.017 0.075 -0.015 0.02 
_cons 0.903* -1.493*** -5.435 -2.711*** -1.140* 
Predicted Prob. 0.8529 0.4124 0.0213 0.0443 0.0408 
N 1,375 
Prob>Chi 2 0.0000 
      Firms below the average of R&D expenditure 
Variables internal bank equity public other sources 
randd 0.176 0.055 0.175 0.409* 0.392* 
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biotech -0.039 -0.014 0.397 -0.137 -0.646 
intangible 0.22 0.05 0.095 0.173 0.341 
tangible -0.19 0.771*** 0.042 0.054 0.103 
size -0.113* 0.177*** 0.054 0.176* 0.143 
foreign 0.399 -0.499** -3.348 -0.162 -0.267 
innovative 0.064 0.421* 0.014 -0.353 -0.39 
fin_barr 0.016 0.155 0.540* -0.006 0.069 
hightech 0.374 -0.165 0.067 0.093 -0.192 
rev_prox -0.019 0.022 0.088 -0.031 0.07 
_cons 1.805*** -2.914*** -3.077*** -2.820*** -2.849*** 
Predicted Prob. 0.9104 0.1743 0.0202 0.0158 0.0219 
N 1,246 
Prob>Chi 2 0.0000 
+Multivariate Probit regression. Includes firms with R&D&i expenses in the 2007-2008 period 
*P. <0.05; **P.<0.01; ***P.<0.001 
1.R&D expenditure average was calculated for the log of the R&D expenditure by employee 
 
In the case of firms with lower R&D expenses, we found that there is was 91% change 
for a firm using internal funds against 85% of higher R&D firms and 88% of the 
complete sample; this means firms with less R&D expenses tended to use more internal 
funding. At the same time firms with lower R&D expenses had a radically lower 
probability to use bank loans with 17% against the 41% of their counterparts, i.e., firms 
with lower amounts of R&D tended to use more internal funding and fewer bank loans.  
 
In the case of Aghion, et al. (2004), and Minola & Cassia (2013), they found that the 
use of equity arises for firms with higher R&D, however, in our case, we cannot support 
that result. The probability of a firm to use equity was not affected by the amount of 
R&D used and had the lower probability of all the funding sources. As we posted 
before, a possible explanation for those differences could be due to the characteristics of 
capital markets in Colombia. In the case of Aghion, et al. (2004), Minola & Cassia 
(2013), and Audretsch & Lehmann (2004), the size and liquidity of the U.K., U.S., and 
German markets can give access to firms for equity funding, therefore, the possibility of 
firms to replace debt for equity when their ventures become larger or risky can arise. 
However, in underdeveloped countries, firms could be equity-constrained for capital 
market characteristics. Therefore, based on the late results, we can argue that in a 
country like Colombia innovative firms will tend to finance their innovation ventures in 
the same way that POT predicts, i.e., firms will be highly supported on internal funding. 
However, if internal funding is not enough to support ventures, firms have to have 
access to bank debt and in lower proportions to other types of funds like equity, public 
grants, and others, with equity being the funding source used least by firms. 
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3.5.Conclusions 
Reviewed research about capital structure of innovative and high technology firms 
seems to be contradictory. Some of the research found that firms finance their R&D and 
innovation activities as described by the pecking order theory (POT), however, some 
others found evidence of an Altered Pecking Order Theory (APOT) structure. However, 
given that researches with evidence related to the APOT have been developed in 
countries like United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany, and in some cases with 
publicly traded firms, we confronted those results founded in a context of developed 
capital markets against an underdeveloped country with small and illiquid capital 
markets like Colombia. 
 
We used the EDIT database for Colombia between 2007-2008 with 2.621 
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees and with positive R&D 
expenditures. Given that there were significate covariance’s among the different types 
of sources used by these firms, we used a multivariate probit model to consider the 
simultaneity of the innovation funding phenomena. 
 
Our results showed that type of expenditures in which firms use their funds are 
important to determine the financial sources used. Firms with internal funding are the 
ones expending on R&D and intangible assets. We believe that firms investing in that 
type of assets face higher information asymmetries and have lower capabilities to 
provide guarantees to use external funding. In the case of bank funding, the loan 
guarantees are fundamental to the access to debt. We argue this because we found 
positive and significant relationships between bank funding and expenditure on tangible 
assets.  
 
In the case of public grants, an expenditure patron similar to the ones using internal 
sources were found, i.e., firms using public grants were the ones expending on R&D 
and intangible assets. We also found that intangible expenditures are related with equity 
funding, and it seems like firms with positive R&D and intangible expenditures 
supported their ventures by using internal, equity, and public funding.  
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Our results are aligned with literature showing that firm characteristics are determinant 
to the way innovative firms can have access to innovation funds (Ullah, et al., 2010; 
Bartolini, 2013; Hummel, et al, 2013; Minola & Cassia, 2013), however, this is not the 
case for internal funding — size, innovative behavior, or the perception of financial 
barriers, because they are not related with internal funding. Contrarily, the use of bank 
funding was strongly related with some firm characteristics. For instance, bigger firms 
and companies with a positive innovative behavior tended to have better access to bank 
funding; in the same direction, firms with a strong perception of financial barriers 
tended to use bank funding in higher proportions. As can be found in the literature, we 
related this late result to the fact that firms with higher perceptions of financial barriers 
had more experience in funding markets than other firms. At the same time, firms 
belonging to high technology industries seemed to be credit-constrained, i.e., there was 
a negative relationship between those industries and bank funding. We argue that 
market imperfections related to banks are stronger for firms in high technology 
industries. We also found that bigger firms are related to the use of public grants, and 
therefore the funding gap between SMEs and big firms is being accentuated for public 
funding.  
 
We found that innovation ventures in Colombia follow a Pecking Order capital 
structure, i.e., firms are strongly using internal funds followed by banks, and then equity 
sources. However, the probability of firms using equity sources was lower than the 
probability of using government grants or other sources.  
 
To understand how some particular groups of firms can have different probabilities of 
access to the financial sources, we studied the success probabilities for firms using one 
or another funding source. We found that no matter how the samples were divided, 
firms were following a pecking order capital structure; however, we found that the 
probabilities for the use of internal sources were higher when firms had lower R&D 
expenditures. Also, the probabilities for the use of bank funding were higher for those 
firms with upper R&D expenditures. 
 
Our results can be contrasted with the Aghion, et al. (2004), Minola & Cassia (2013) 
and Audretsch & Lehmann (2004) research. Firms placed in countries like the United 
Kingdom, United States, or Germany, have higher access to equity funding given the 
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characteristics of capital markets in those countries, and therefore, the possibility of 
firms replacing the debt for equity when their ventures become larger or risky can arise. 
This because in order to successfully raise equity from markets, firms need to be 
supported by a liquid and specialized capital market to undertake an IPO, or to provide 
the necessary conditions for an exit strategy for an early venture capitalist (Hall & 
Lerner, 2010; Kerr & Nanda, 2015). However, in underdeveloped countries like 
Colombia, firms could be equity-constrained given that capital markets are in 
embryonic stages. Therefore, if internal funding is not enough to support ventures, firms 
have access to bank debt, and in lower proportions to other types of funding like equity 
or public grants. 
 
These results have strong policy implications if innovative and high technology firms 
have problems financing their ventures, and in developed capital markets those firms 
have easier access to high risk equity and venture capital it is necessary for policy 
makers of underdeveloped countries to back up the expansion of strong and liquid 
capital markets in order to support the growth of innovative ventures and all the 
economic and social benefits related to those activities. 
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Appendix A. High technology industries 
Industry description ISIC Rev.3.1 Number of firms 
Manufacture of medical appliances and instruments and 
appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other 
purposes, except optical instruments 
331 21 
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 311 17 
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 312 16 
Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 319 12 
Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment 315 11 
Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 313 5 
Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary 
batteries 
314 5 
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components 
321 2 
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods 
323 2 
Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 332 2 
Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 353 2 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy 
322 1 
Total 96 (3.7% of the sample) 
Source: EDIT 2007-2008 
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Chapter 4. Where did the money go? Long-term 
input and output additionality of innovation 
subsidies in Spain 
4.1.Introduction 
In the last century, the concern of economists about the relationship among innovation, 
growth, and development has increased. Given that we now know that innovation 
activities create positive spillover effects on society, policy makers have a genuine 
interest in encouraging those types of activities around the world. However, innovation 
activities are risky and expensive, and sometimes private firms are not disposed to start 
those activities; in that sense, local and regional governments around the world design 
policies to spur innovation activities of private firms. Among those policies, one can 
find attractive tax regimens for firms investing in innovation, the promotion of 
innovation projects for public universities and laboratories, creation of scholarship 
programs to increase the number of researchers, and programs directed to private firms 
to diminish the risk and cost of undertaking innovation projects in the form of direct 
grants. 
 
Given the rise of innovation surveys and methodologies focused on the determination of 
impacts of public policies, in recent years a growing number of researchers have been 
trying to understand the effects of innovation policies on firms’ behavior, especially 
focusing on the impact of subsidies among firms; (i.e. if private firms do not engage in 
innovation because of market failures and it is possible to demonstrate that public 
subsidies generate positive, innovative behavior in private firms, those subsidies are 
simultaneously generating positive spillover effects on firms and society by diminishing 
market failures). 
 
The majority of studies relating to subsidies and private firm innovation activities use 
non- structural models to measure those impacts (Cerulli, 2010). The use of this type of 
methodology is in part due to its relative simplicity compared with other methodologies 
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like structural models, in which it is necessary to determine the functional structure of a 
model of impact for subsidies to avoid some econometric issues like endogeneity. 
 
In addition, most of studies have been focused on the possibility of the crowding-out or 
crowding-in effect of subsidies on private R&D (input additionality), neglecting that 
subsidies can have positive effects on other firm aspects. A small group of studies 
generally classify these other effects as output and behavioral additionalities. The 
former is generally measured by patents and revenues and the latter by cooperation and 
management variables related to innovative projects.  
 
One of the biggest disadvantages of the literature reviewed for this research is the fact 
that in most of the cases, data comes from a cross section, which does not allow 
researchers to form conclusions about the effects of subsidy policies in the mid- and 
long-term or after the subsidy has been implemented. However, in the mid- and long-
term, the additionality effects of subsidy could be more visible given the long-term 
nature of the innovation phenomena. This research is a small effort to understand the 
phenomena of subsidies to innovation and their input and output additionality effects in 
the long-term. We use a conditional difference in difference (CDID) approach given the 
long-term characteristics of innovation projects that in most cases cannot create impacts 
in a small period. We focus on two particular analyses of our data; first, we want to 
determine whether firm size is relevant in measuring additionality effects; therefore, we 
run separate models for SMEs and for large firms. In addition, we want to address 
whether a policy of reiterative grants makes firms prone to present higher additionality 
effects. Therefore, we also run separate regressions for firms receiving subsidies in at 
least two years in the study period against firms receiving subsidies in only a single year 
during the same period. This is novel research in the sense that this is the first time that 
long-term additionality effects will be addressed in Spain, and we are examining the 
effect of reiterative subsidies granted to firms on input and output additionalities. 
 
Data used for this research comes from a yearly database panel for Spain firms for the 
years 2005 to 2013. The research is structured as follows: in the next section the 
literature related to the effects of subsidies on firm activities is discussed; in section 4.3, 
the data and methodology are presented. In section 4.4, the results of the econometric 
approach are debated, and in the final section, concluding remarks are presented. 
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4.2.Literature review 
4.2.1. Issues with policy evaluation methodologies 
Economists around the world agree that investment in research, development and 
innovation activities (R&D&i) generates positive spillover effects on society; to name 
just a few of those effects, one can bring up the raise in firm productivity, creation of 
new knowledge for firms developing R&D&I activities, and the effects of the new 
knowledge on markets, clients and competitors (David, et al., 2000). 
 
In this direction, policy makers want to spur innovation inside firms, because of the 
positive effects created by those activities. However, there are some market failures that 
prevent firms from engaging in privately financed innovation projects. Positive effects 
of innovation can affect not only the innovator but its competitors also, and a firm in 
that case is expending valuable resources on activities that will benefit their 
competition; in other words, knowledge is a non-rival good and competitors can have 
access to that knowledge as free riders. In that sense, firms will not have incentives to 
engage in innovation activities because they are benefiting competitors. Moreover, 
innovation is costly and risky; therefore, some firms do not engage in innovation 
because the cost of finance innovation activities with external sources is higher 
compared with other types of ventures; simultaneously, risk of innovation arises 
because R&D&I activities are uncertain, i.e., innovation projects cannot guarantee the 
successful creation of a product or a service, because the high dependence of new 
knowledge creation on these projects (Arrow, 1962; Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004; Hall & 
Lerner, 2010). 
 
The above market failures tend to decrease the level of innovation projects to less than 
socially desired levels. Therefore, policy makers seek a way in which they can diminish 
the effect of failures. Among others, policies used to increase the level of innovation 
projects comprise i) tax incentives that reduce the cost of innovation activities and allow 
firms to choose the type of projects in which they want to engage and ii) subsidies to 
innovation that decrease the risk level of projects because the government provides 
firms with cash to develop their ideas of innovation, but do not allow firms to engage in 
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any type of innovation project, and therefore firms and projects financed are chosen by 
science and technology agencies (David, et al., 2000). 
 
Given that public resources are scarce, researchers wonder about the effectiveness of 
government financed programs. If governments must choose among a great number of 
unmet needs like education, health, infrastructure, military, or innovation, how can they 
ensure that the chosen programs are appropriate to finance? Additionally, if 
governments decide to finance a determined policy, like innovation, how can they 
ensure that those programs are creating the expected effects? 
 
What is sought by the empirical models for evaluation of public policies, and 
specifically in the case of subsidy policies for innovation, is to determine whether the 
companies receiving the subsidy show a more innovative performance than firms 
without subsidies, e.g., a researcher can evaluate whether the R&D expenditure levels 
are different for those groups; if this is true, it can be said that the subsidy is creating an 
effect in the R&D&I expenditure of those firms. In the literature, these types of effects 
are called input additionality, and they can be contrasted with the output and behavioral 
additionality effects of subsidies; the former are related to the level of innovation output 
which would not have been obtained without grants, and the latter is related to the way 
firms change their management and relationships after a grant (Autio, et al., 2008; 
Clarysse, et al., 2009; Bergman, et al., 2010). 
 
Additionality comparisons have two fundamental issues; the first is that subsidies are 
not granted randomly (i.e., public agencies determine if firms should be “awarded” or 
not with subsidies). For additionality analysis, this is a problem because firms awarded 
with subsidies have dissimilar characteristics compared with non-subsidized firms, e.g., 
if the agency tries to maximize the social benefits of grants, will be interested in the 
selection of firms, or innovation projects, that make the best use of those resources, and 
the agency will adopt a “picking the winner” strategy (Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004). 
Generally, those winner firms are the ones with R&D&I laboratories, patent 
applications, higher levels of R&D expenditure, and other characteristics related to the 
successful accomplishment of innovation projects. Given that there is a non-random 
criterion in the provision of subsidies and that innovation input and output levels of 
those firms are different before grants, a simple statistic strategy of mean differences 
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between the innovation inputs and outputs of firms, with and without subsidies, is not 
appropriate and could drive researchers to conclude that subsidies are the cause of 
differences that were present even before the grant (Cerulli & Potí, 2008). 
 
The second problem arises from the last one; given that a simple mean comparison is 
not appropriate, it is necessary to develop a set of empirical strategies to evaluate the 
subsidy policy. Generally, two sets of methodologies can be found, structural and non-
structural. For the first group, it is necessary to determine the functional form of the 
empirical model; for example, if a model correlates the R&D expenditure against the 
subsidy as an explanatory variable, the error term and subsidy would be correlated and 
would cause inconsistent estimations given that agencies do not select granted firms 
randomly (Busom, 2000; Almus & Czartnitzki, 2003; Cerulli, 2010). A way to solve 
these problems is to include all the variables used by government agencies to select 
subsidized firms as control variables. However, if some of the variables remain 
unobservable another strategy is needed.  
 
Another way to solve this issue is the use of instrumental variables (IV) in which a 
system of equations is developed to extract the subsidy variable from the original 
equation; the subsidy is then related with some IVs to determine their statistical 
relationship with two stages less square (2SLS) or three stages less square (3SLS) 
strategies. If the IVs are exogenous to the error term, then the results of the system are 
not biased. The issue with this type of model is that it can be difficult to determine the 
IV to use and probe the exogenous nature of that variable with the original equation 
error term. Studies using these methodologies can be found in Wallsten (2000), Busom 
(2000), Gelabert, et.al. (2009), Cerulli (2010) and García & Mohnen (2010). 
 
On the other hand, the non-parametric methodologies are the most used in the field of 
innovation to solve the randomness issue; this type of methodology tries to answer one 
simple question: What would a subsidized firm do without the subsidies? If there are 
some effects of the grant policies, the comparison of a single firm with and without the 
subsidies can show the effects caused by a subsidy on that company. However, the 
comparison of these effects is not possible because an observer can only perceive one of 
those states of the firm (i.e., states are mutually exclusive). The last is recognized in the 
literature as the counterfactual issue; a researcher cannot observe in each moment of 
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time a firm with and without the subsidy, so the answer to the question raised before 
must be addressed differently (Heckman, et al., 1999). 
 
One way to solve the counterfactual issue is to select a control group to compare with 
subsidized firms. To do this, it is possible to identify a set of firms similar in all aspects 
with granted firms except for the grant received; this methodology is called the 
parametric matching procedure. The idea behind this method is to reestablish the 
conditions of an experiment when no randomized control group is available 
(Chudnovsky, et al., 2006). The perfect case of a matching procedure would include as 
many characteristics as the ones used to determine subsidy grants; however, the bigger 
the characteristics vector, the lower the likelihood of find a match between the 
subsidized and control groups (Görg & Strobl, 2007). 
 
The two stages propensity matching score methodology tries to solve this issue. This 
procedure was developed by Rubin (1977), and it has been used in most of the studies 
evaluating subsidies to innovation with cross-sectional data. The procedure considers 
the counterfactual issue, and therefore, compares a firm with a subsidy against a “twin” 
firm without the subsidy, but instead of a vector of characteristics uses the likelihood of 
a firm to receive subsidies, thereby reducing the matching issue to only one 
characteristic, called the propensity score. In the first stage of this procedure, generally, 
a probit model is developed to match firms with similar propensity scores depending on 
a set of firm characteristics, and in the second stage the matched firms are compared to 
determine the additional effects of subsidies. The rationality behind this methodology is 
that if grant likelihoods before a grant were similar, the post-grant differences among 
firms’ characteristics must be due to the subsidy. 
 
The two stages matching procedure is a powerful tool to evaluate the effect of subsidies. 
However, has a major drawback; it only allows one to control for a firm’s observable 
heterogeneity among control and granted firms, i.e., some unobserved characteristics are 
still present during the matching procedure, and these characteristics could make firms 
react differently when external shocks arise. 
 
The difference in difference (DID) methodology tries to control for the lack of 
observable differences among firms and the counterfactual issue comparing firms 
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receiving subsidies before and after the grant, then, comparing those changes against the 
changes of firms not receiving subsidies before and after the treatment period.  
 
The rationality behind the DID methodology is that differences in behavior can be 
observed in the periods before and after treatment and inside treated and not treated 
groups. However, the drawbacks are that it needs a panel or repeated cross section data 
to be developed and does not control for observed heterogeneity among firms. To solve 
the latter issue, a combination of parametric matching and DID procedures can be done; 
this procedure is called the conditional difference in difference (CDID) estimation and it 
was first proposed by Blundell & Dias (2002). In this procedure, the counterfactual is 
addressed by using a propensity score matching in the period before the subsidy was 
granted, which is expected to identify firms with a similar likelihood of being granted 
even before the subsidy occurs. Generally, this procedure is done by means of a probit 
model. Once the matching procedure is done, a DID methodology is applied to the firms 
in the control group before and after the subsidy and with treated firms before and after 
the procedure. If the differences between the control group and the treated group after 
the treatment period are significant, then the subsidy is creating an effect on treated 
firms. This methodology controls for counterfactual and observed heterogeneity with 
the matching procedure and for the unobserved and time-invariant characteristics with 
the DID procedure. Therefore, the final results of the CDID methodology are unbiased 
(Blundell & Dias, 2002; Aerts & Schmidt, 2008). 
4.2.2. Evaluation of innovation subsidy policies in practice 
Given that innovation is a long-term endeavor, public policy evaluation must be 
developed with a long-term perspective. However, it is hard to find panel data on 
innovation to perform such analysis. In the case of Community Innovation Surveys 
(CIS) for Europe, few studies have been developed, and in most of the cases, a cross 
section analysis has been performed using parametric and non-parametric 
methodologies. 
 
Among the papers in which innovation subsidies policies has been evaluated, a central 
question has arisen: Does the granting of subsidies create a crowding out effect on 
firms’ private R&D expenditure (i.e. there is a substitution or a complementary effect of 
the subsidies on the firm expenditure on R&D)? In terms of policy, the question is 
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relevant given that firms can react to subsidies in multiple ways. If government policies, 
as discussed earlier, seek to grant subsidies to firms with higher success likelihood on 
innovation projects, it is possible that the subsidy displace private R&D expenditure and 
the firm will probably expend the same amount of R&D with or without the grant 
because the innovation project promises positive outcomes in the near future. However, 
if a firm elevates the level of private R&D after the subsidy, a crowding in effect will 
arise; this could happen when firms perceive the subsidy as a complement of their own 
effort (Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004). 
 
The great majority of the studies about innovation subsidies using the propensity score 
matching methodology, find that there is a crowding in or a complementary effect on 
private R&D (Busom, 2000; Almus & Czartnitzki, 2003; Heijs & Herrera, 2004; Aerts 
& Czarnitzki, 2004; Lööf & Heshmati, 2005; Czarnitzki et al., 2007; González & Pazó, 
2008; Aerts & Schmidt, 2008; Cerulli & Potí, 2008; Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2012; 
Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2013; Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2014). 
 
As it was posited before, innovation creates positive spillover or additionality effects on 
society, like elevation of markets productivity, effects of new knowledge on markets, 
clients and competitors, new jobs, higher levels of exportations, cooperation agreements 
and so on (Klette, et al., 2000); for that reason, it is logical to think that innovation 
subsidies also create another type of positive spillover or additionality effect on firms. 
However, just a few group of researchers have focused on other type of variable, 
different from the question about substitution and complementarity between public and 
private expenditure. 
 
In the case of behavioral additionalities, Autio et. al. (2008) using a sample of 66 
Finland companies between 1998 and 2002, finds that second order additionalities 
(behavioral additionalities) like technological learning, market learning and 
internationalization learning are boosted by innovation grants. Clarysse et. al. (2009) 
using Flanders data, finds a strong relationship among government grants, formalization 
of innovation processes, innovation management capabilities, and firms research paths. 
Wanzenböck et.al. (2013) using Austria’s transport sector data, discovers that project 
desertion likelihood is smaller after a grant and that cooperation and knowledge transfer 
rise after innovation grants. 
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In the case of output additionalities, Wallsten (2000), using a parametric approach, 
wonders if subsidy grants create an effect on employment in the U.S. firms and finds 
that there are no effects on total employment, additionaly, finding that there is a 
substitution effect of the subsidies against private R&D expenditure. Czarnitzki et al. 
(2007) using the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) from Germany and Finland, 
suggests that firms without subsidies would generate fewer patents than firms with 
subsidies. García & Mohnen (2010) investigate the effect of subsidies on output 
additionality, measured by the share of revenues due to innovation; they use the CIS for 
Austria and discover that firms with subsidies to innovation increase their new to the 
market revenues by 3.4%. Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento (2013), estimate the effect of 
public subsidies on employment level for the north region of Belgium and discover that 
there is a positive effect of subsidies on R&D employees. Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento 
(2014) wonder if subsidy grants have effects on innovative revenues and patent 
behavior in Germany; they find that subsidies have a positive effect on both output 
measures. Except for Wallsten (2000), consulted studies find that there is a positive 
effect of innovation subsidies on input, behavioral and output additionalities, and 
therefore, there is empirical evidence of positive spillover effects of innovation 
subsidies. 
 
Further, even when there is genuine concern about other spillover effects of innovation 
subsidies on firms, there is little evidence about the mid and long-term effects of 
innovation subsidies on firms; this is caused by the cross-sectional nature of most data 
used by the mentioned studies that mostly uses one wave of innovation surveys. 
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions; Lach (2002) uses a DID procedure with panel 
data from Israel to determine if there is a positive effect of subsidies on R&D behavior 
on small and large firms. Lach found that subsidies create a positive effect in the long-
term for small firms, but cannot demonstrate that the same happens with large firms. 
Using the same methodology, Sanguinetti (2005) found that Argentinian firms between 
1992 and 2001 have a crowding in effect on internal R&D after subsidies. However, he 
finds no effects on total R&D expenditure. Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento (2013) wonder if 
treatment effects are stable over time and uses data from Belgium for 2004, 2006 and 
2008, with three separate parametric matching procedures, and concludes that the 
effects of subsidies are stable over time. (i.e., there is no evidence of a decline of the 
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additionally effects of subsidies policy over time). Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento (2013) 
also discusses the effects of multiple subsidies on firms and finds that there is no 
declining effect on input additionality for those firms. 
 
In the case of CDID methodology, Görg & Strobl (2007) using data from Ireland firms 
throughout the years 1999-2002, conclude that there is an additionality effect on R&D 
expenditure in the case of small or medium size subsidies. However, there is a 
replacement effect in the case of large subsidies. Aerts & Schmidt (2008) using 
Germany and Flanders data for CIS III and CIS IV waves, concludes that there is an 
additionality effect on R&D after subsidies; as part of the conclusion of this research 
they suggest studing the output effects of grants by using the same methodology as we 
are approaching on this research. A CDID case worth highlighting is the Chudnovsky 
et. al. (2006) research; in this paper, 1998-2004 data of Argentinian firms is used, and 
the research concludes that subsidies spur private R&D expenditure but have no long-
term effects on productivity or new to the market product revenues. As far as we know, 
this is the only case when a CDID methodology has been used to study the additionality 
output effects of innovation grants.  
This is novel research in the sense that this is the first time that long-term additionality 
effects will be addressed in Spain and because we are researching the effect of 
reiterative subsidies granted to firms on input and output additionalities. 
4.3.Empirical Approach 
4.3.1. Methodology  
In this research, a methodology CDID is used. This procedure combines a parametric 
matching approach whit a DID methodology. We want to determinate whether firms 
receiving subsidies have input and output additionality effects in the long-term and if 
there are any differences on additionality of firms receiving recurrent subsidies. The 
rationality behind this methodology can be described as follows. 
 
Suppose that each firm i has two potential states, Yi1 (subsidized or treated firm) or Yi0 
(not subsidized or control firm). The effect of subsidy could be calculated by E(Yi1- Yi0). 
However, Yi0 cannot be observed and is a counterfactual (i.e. a firm cannot have both 
states, subsidized and not subsidized at the same time). Therefore, a parallel approach 
has to be done to measure an average effect of subsidies. 
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We can define Di as a dichotomous indicator of grants with a value of one representing 
a firm receiving subsidies and zero otherwise. Therefore, the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATET) could be calculated as: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1)  
 
However, 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1)  is also a counterfactual that cannot be observed because it 
measures the outcome Y of a not subsidized firm in the case of been subsidized; 
therefore, this parameter must be estimated. If conditional independence between 
subsidies and outcome variables could be assumed, a set of observable characteristics X 
used to select granted firms could be used in order to determine the outcomes of non-
treated (control) firms. Therefore, it can be said that: 
 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 0) 
 
However, not all the characteristics that should be included in Xi are observable or 
available, and the more variables included on firms’ characteristics vector, the more 
difficult it would be to find a match among treated and not treated firms. According to 
Rubin (1977) and Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), this problem can be overcome by 
reducing the firm characteristics vector to a single index, the propensity score, that 
accounts for the likelihood of a firm to receive a subsidy. In that case: 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝐹(𝑋𝑖) 
 
It is possible to determine Xi using a cumulative standard normal distribution function 
by means of a probit model, and in that case, the propensity score measures the 
likelihood of a firm receiving a subsidy. This propensity score is used to match treated 
and not treated firms and the comparison of those groups of firms could be calculated 
by: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑋𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = 0) 
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Given that we want to determine the long-term effects of subsidies and we are using 
panel data to do so, we extend the last equation to compare the effects of subsidies on 
time using a DID methodology: 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1,  𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0,  𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 = 0)) 
 
This is a combination of a DID methodology with a previous propensity score matching 
procedure; this is called CDID methodology and it was proposed by Blundell & Dias 
(2002). This methodology controls for counterfactual and observed heterogeneity with 
the matching procedure and for the unobserved and time invariant characteristics with 
the DID procedure. Therefore, the final results of the CDID methodology are unbiased 
(Aerts & Schmidt, 2008). For this research, we use the procedure of CDID developed 
by Villa (2016). 
4.3.2. Data 
The data used in this research comes from the PITEC
8
 database for the years 2005 to 
2013. Our sample consists of firms not receiving any kind of public subsidy during 
2005 and 2007
9
 to control for any effects caused by subsidies in later years. Within this 
sample, it is possible to find two types of companies, those not receiving any subsidies 
during the period 2008-2013 (this will be our control group) and firms receiving 
subsidies at least once during the same period (this will be our treated group). The 
baseline period will be 2007, and the treatment years will be 2008-2013 with 2013 
being our follow-up period. We want to determine the long-term effects of receiving 
subsidies to innovation, therefore, separation of these sub-samples has as its main 
objective to evaluate the long-term effect comparing 2007 against 2013. In addition, we 
control our sample for firms with positive internal R&D expenditure, and we reduce our 
sample to 1559 firms. 
 
As we noted previously, the procedure that we use to control for the counterfactual is a 
propensity matching score, in this case, that matching is performed with data of the 
sample for the 2007 period. The variables used to run the probit regression previous to 
the matching are the log of number of employees (lnsize), a dummy variable controlling 
                                                 
8
 Technologic Innovation Panel, for its acronym in Spanish 
9
 For the year 2006 PITEC has no data about received subsidies on firms. 
79 
 
the firm group belonging (group), a dummy variable controlling for foreign origin 
(foreign), a dummy variable counting the fact that firms sell their products mainly in 
countries outside the European Union (nonue_exp), a dummy controlling for firms 
perceiving strong financial impediments on their innovation activities (barfin) and two 
dummies controlling for high technology manufacture and services industries firms 
(htmanuf; htserv)
10
. 
 
Following the Villa (2016) methodology, after the probit model a kernel propensity 
score matching was developed using an Epanechnikov kernel function; this allows us to 
have control and treated groups of firms in which the observed heterogeneity is no 
longer an issue (i.e. the main characteristics of firms before the subsidy are controlled 
and now the only difference between groups is that some companies will receive 
innovation grants in the future). Therefore, any differences in outcome variables on the 
follow-up years must be the effect of those subsidies; the results of this matching 
procedure are presented on Appendix B. 
 
After the matching, the DID procedure compares the mean outcome variable of the 
control group in the baseline year (2007) against the mean outcome variable in the 
follow-up year (2013). This is the long-term difference in outcome for control firms. In 
addition, this procedure is repeated for treated firms, this is, the long-term difference in 
outcome for treated companies. Given that with matching procedure we control for firm 
observed characteristics, the comparison of long-term differences of control and treated 
firms (DID) is the ATET of subsidies on outcome variables and it is also controlled by 
the invariant and unobserved firm characteristics. 
 
As effect outcomes, we use two separate sets of variables (Table 12). The first group is 
a set of input variables measuring the effects on internal and external R&D expenditure 
or intensity and the number of employees working on R&D activities. The second group 
is a set of output variables measuring total revenues and new to the market revenues. 
We use these variables as outputs because the fact that firms increase their revenues as a 
result of innovation subsidies means that grants have direct effects on the potential 
expansion of firms and markets. 
                                                 
10
 For simplicity, the results of the probit models used to perform the matching procedure are not 
presented. These results can be made available on request.  
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Table 12. Input and output outcome variables 
Type of 
outcome 
Outcome variable description 
Outcome 
variable 
name 
Input 
Logarithm of internal R&D expenditure rd_ln 
Logarithm of internal R&D expenditure by employee (Internal R&D/ total 
employees) 
emprd_ln 
Logarithm of internal R&D intensity (Internal R&D/ revenues) intensity 
Logarithm of number of employees working on R&D ln_idsize 
Logarithm of R&D employees’ proportion (R&D employees / Total 
Employees) 
ln_idprop 
Logarithm of external R&D expenditure exrd_ln 
Logarithm of external R&D expenditure by employee (External R&D/ total 
employees) 
empexrd_ln 
Logarithm of external R&D intensity (External R&D/ revenues) ex_intensity 
Output 
Logarithm of Revenues rev_ln 
Logarithm of Revenues by employee (Revenues/ total employees) emrev_ln 
Logarithm of new to the market total revenues  nmarket_ln 
Logarithm of new to the market total revenues by employee (new market 
sales / total employees) 
nmarket_em 
 
We would also like to measure the effects on behavior outcomes (cooperation, 
abandonment of projects, etc.), but we cannot find on PITEC survey any behavior-
related variables measured as continuous variables; the issue with this is that our 
methodology uses a linear regression to perform the CDID effects (Villa, 2016) and, 
therefore, using non-continuous variables to measure behavioral additionalities would 
result in biased parameters. Moreover, the fact that a linear regression is used plays in 
our favor also; given that as is shown in Table 12, all our variables are measured on 
logarithms, the CDID effects could be interpreted as a percentage change among control 
and treated firms caused by subsidies after we transform the results by an exponential 
function
11
. 
 
In addition, we want to understand whether the long-term effect of the subsidies affects 
SME’s and large firms differently, because SMEs tend to deal with strong market 
failures preventing them from performing innovation activities. Therefore, we expect 
that additionality effects would be bigger for SMEs than for large firms. To account for 
those facts, we first perform CDID models for all firms; then we separate our analysis 
of SMEs and large firms. 
                                                 
11
 Exp[ATET]-1 
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Lastly, we perform a separate analysis for firms receiving recurrent subsidies during the 
period 2008-2013; as can be seen in Table 13, 63.7% of firms (334/524) have received 
more than one grant during the period 2008-2013, These 334 firms will be our treated 
group in the last regression, to understand whether firms with recurrent subsidies 
present any differences from the complete treated group. 
Table 13. Sample Description 
Number 
of grants 
All 
sample 
SME's 
Large 
Firms 
0 (control 
group) 
1035 856 179 
1 190 155 35 
2 134 116 18 
3 75 58 17 
4 64 50 14 
5 36 24 12 
6 25 20 5 
Treated 524 423 101 
Total 1559 1279 280 
 
Lastly, we perform robustness checks combining firm size and recurrence grants DID to 
determine whether there are any differences among the full sample and the SMEs and 
large firms’ subsamples. As can be seen in Table 13, 63,4% and 65.3% of SMEs and 
large firms receive recurrent subsidies in the 2008-2013 period. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Effects on the full sample 
Table 14 shows the results of the CDID analysis for the full sample of firms receiving 
subsidies for at least one year. At first glance, the estimations for the baseline, follow-up 
periods, and the DID shows that a crowding out effect can be discarded; after an 
exponential transformation of these results it can be said that compared with control 
firms, companies receiving subsidies expend 31% more on internal R&D, have 24% 
more internal R&D expenditures per employee, and have 24% more R&D intensity in 
2013 than in 2007. Consequently, there is an additionality effect of grants over internal 
R&D. 
 
Further, the effects on external R&D additionality are significant. Firms granted expend 
66% more on external R&D, and 58% more on external R&D per employee, and have 
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58% more intensity of external R&D. Given that the effects of external R&D almost 
double those of the internal R&D expenditures, it can be said that treated firms privilege 
the increase of knowledge external acquisition over knowledge internal formation; in 
line with Cohen & Levinthal (1990), acquisition of external knowledge is a way to spur 
internal R&D that generates absorptive capacities. Therefore, it is expected that firms 
acquiring more external R&D have better long-term capacities to develop internal 
knowledge, appropriate external technologies, and to participate in cooperative 
ventures. 
Table 14. CDID. Firms receiving at least one subsidy in 2008 – 2013. Full Sample. 
Additionality variables 
Baseline Follow-up Diff in Diff 
[2- 1] 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
2007 2013 
Diff (T-C) [1] Diff (T-C) [2] 
Input 
rd_ln 0.218*** 0.487*** 0.269** (31%) 
emprd_ln 0.173***  0.386*** 0.213** (24%) 
intensity 0.254***  0.469*** 0.215* (24%) 
exrd_ln 0.598*** 1.107*** 0.509*** (66%) 
empexrd_ln 0.552*** 1.006*** 0.453*** (57%) 
ex_intensity 0.633*** 1.089*** 0.456*** (58%) 
ln_idsize 0.185*** 0.362*** 0.178*** (19%) 
ln_idprop 0.181*** 0.337*** 0.156* (17%) 
Output 
rev_ln -0,036 0,018 0,054 
emrev_ln -0.081* -0,058 0,022 
nmarket_ln 0,056 0,198 0,142 
nmarket_em -0,011 -0,095 -0,083 
***P. Value<0.01; **P. Value<0.05; *P. Value<0.1 
Sample: Firms with no subsidies in period 2005 - 2007 and positive internal R&D expenditures 
Treated (T): Firms receiving at least one subsidy in period 2008-2013 
Control (C): Firms with no subsidies in period 2008–2013 
1.
 EXP(DID)-1, presented only for significant models. 
 
The results exposed in Table 14 show that in the long-term firms elevates by 19% the 
number of R&D employees and by 17% the proportion of R&D employees. This is 
important given that firms need workers with strong individual absorptive capacities in 
order to develop new knowledge and to develop innovation skills within the firm; in 
addition, policy-makers are interested in spurring high knowledge workers in order to 
generate more innovation spillovers in markets when those workers go to other firms or 
generate new start-ups. 
 
Further, the results presented in Table 14 show that there are no long-term output 
additionality effects, at least for the total, by employee and new to the market revenues. 
These findings are related to the ones of Chudnovsky et. al. (2006). It seems like grants 
have no long-term effects on sales, productivity or new to the market revenues for 
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Spanish firms. The fact that we found input but not output additionalities, could give an 
important message to policy-makers and researchers in order to identify those output 
variables prone to vary during the follow-up period. Perhaps it is necessary to focus on 
another kind of output outcomes, like patents or behavior additionality, to test potential 
spillover effects of grants. However, in our case, the fact that linear regressions were 
used to determine the CDID results did not allow us to use any of the binary or count 
behavior and outcome variables funded on PITEC to test that hypothesis. 
4.4.1. Effects on SMEs and large firms 
In Table 15 the results for the subsamples of SMEs and large firms are presented. In the 
first place, it is important to mention that there are numerous input additionality effects 
for SMEs, whereas in large firms the CDID models were not significant. For SMEs, the 
crowding out hypothesis can be rejected given that firms receiving at least one subsidy 
expend 36% more on internal R&D than control firms and expend 19% more on 
internal R&D per employee. Even when the intensity of internal R&D is not significant, 
there are sufficient hints to conclude that there is an additionality effect of grants on 
SMEs’ internal R&D expenditure. 
 
External R&D expenditure follows the same patterns as the full sample, i.e. the effects 
are bigger than those of internal R&D expenditure in a range from 44% of external 
R&D per employee to 64% of total external R&D expenditure showing that after 
subsidies, SMEs also privilege the increase of knowledge external acquisition over 
knowledge internal formation. 
Table 15. CDID for firms receiving at least one subsidy in period 2008–2013. 
Additionality variables 
SMEs DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
Large firms DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
Input 
rd_ln 0.305*** (36%) 0.131 
emprd_ln 0.176* (19%) 0.339 
intensity 0,205 0.206 
exrd_ln 0.496*** (64%) 0.511 
empexrd_ln 0.368** (44%) 0.719 
ex_intensity 0.397** (49%) 0.586 
ln_idsize 0.183*** (20%) 0.075 
ln_idprop 0.096 0.295 
Output 
rev_ln 0.099 -0.075 
emrev_ln 0.001 0.133 
nmarket_ln 0.067 0.477 
nmarket_em -0.302 0.534 
***P. Value<0.01; **P. Value<0.05; *P. Value<0.1 
Sample: Firms with no subsidies in the period 2005-2007 and positive internal R&D expenditures. 
Treated (T): Firms receiving at least one subsidy in period 2008-2013 
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Control (C): Firms with no subsidies in period 2008-2013 
1.
 EXP(DID)-1, presented only for significant models. 
 
The number of R&D employees has positive outcomes also, granted SMEs tend to have 
20% more R&D linked workers. The fact that the proportion of R&D employees (ln-
idprop) has no significant effects could show that smaller firms increase the number of 
total and R&D employees at a similar rate.  
 
As was seen for the full sample, there are no outcome additionality effects for SMEs 
and large firms. Additionally, there are no effects of any kind for larger firms as can be 
seen in Table 15; our results are aligned with those of Lach (2002). The fact that larger 
firms show no additionality input and output effects could be an important message for 
policy-makers; even when there are no crowding out or backward input and output 
effects for large firms, it seems like smaller firms tend to take better advantage of 
subsidies. 
4.4.2. Single vs. recurrent subsidies 
Results for firms receiving single and multiple grants for the period 2008-2013 are 
presented in Table 16 and Table 17, respectively. Firms receiving a single grant (Table 
16) seems to have fewer additionality effects than those receiving them on a recurrent 
basis. Single granted firms have additionality effects only on external R&D 
expenditures; those effects vary from 37% for external R&D intensity to 46% for total 
external R&D expenditure. Small firms tend to expend 21% more on internal R&D, and 
therefore, it is possible to discard a crowding out effect for those firms. However, for 
large firms and the complete set of firms this crowding out effect cannot be rejected. It 
seems like the concession of single grants tends to elevate the internal and external 
R&D expenditure of SMEs, but it has no effects on R&D employees or output 
variables. Like the previous models, large firms tend to show no additionality effects 
when a single subsidy is granted to them. 
Table 16. CDID for firms receiving subsidies in a single year 
Additionality variables 
All Firms DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
SMEs DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
Large Firms DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
Input 
rd_ln 0.164 0.193* (21%) -0.055 
emprd_ln 0.168 0.141 0.282 
intensity 0.101 0.110 0.101 
exrd_ln 0.376*** (46%) 0.380** (46%) 0.111 
empexrd_ln 0.380** (46%) 0.328* (39%) 0.448 
ex_intensity 0.313* (37%) 0.297 0.267 
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ln_idsize 0.053 0.065 -0.127 
ln_idprop 0.075 0.036 0.199 
Output 
rev_ln 0.062 0.083 -0.156 
emrev_ln 0.067 0.031 0.181 
nmarket_ln 0.154 0.055 0.406 
nmarket_em 0.024 -0.170 0.519 
***P. Value<0.01; **P. Value<0.05; *P. Value<0.1 
Sample: Firms with no subsidies in the period 2005-2007 and positive internal R&D expenditures. 
Treated (T): Firms receiving at least one subsidy in period 2008-2013. 
Control (C): Firms with no subsidies in period 2008–2013. 
1.
 EXP(DID)-1, presented only for significant models. 
 
Results for firms receiving subsidies for multiple years are shown in Table 17. Those 
firms have several additionality input effects for the complete set of firms, SMEs, and 
for large firms. The complete set of firms has positive additionality effects on internal 
and external expenditures on R&D and in the recruiting and proportion of R&D related 
employees; interestingly, a comparison of results of Table 14 and Table 17 shows that 
the additionality effects on multiple granted firms (all firms and SMEs) are bigger than 
those of the full sample. These results show that policy-makers may be interested in 
innovation policies where firms, especially SMEs, participate in a long-time innovation 
aid program rather than being granted with sporadic subsidies.  
Table 17. CDID for firms receiving subsidies for multiple years 
Additionality variables 
All Firms DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
SMEs DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
Large Firms DID 
(Exponential 
 Transformation
1
) 
Input 
rd_ln 0.329*** (39%) 0.370*** (45%) 0.252 
emprd_ln 0.241** (27%) 0.198* (22%) 0.398 
intensity 0.286** (33%) 0.261* (30%) 0.314 
exrd_ln 0.589*** (80%) 0.564*** (76%) 0.714 
empexrd_ln 0.501*** (65%) 0.392** (48%) 0.860* (136%) 
ex_intensity 0.546*** (73%) 0.455** (58%) 0.776* (117%) 
ln_idsize 0.249*** (28%) 0.252*** (29%) 0.205 
ln_idprop 0.206** (23%) 0.132 0.376 
Output 
rev_ln 0.043 0.109 -0.063 
emrev_ln -0.007 -0.015 0.084 
nmarket_ln 0.137 0.078 0.466 
nmarket_em -0.181 -0.374 0.596 
***P. Value<0.01; **P. Value<0.05; *P. Value<0.1 
Sample: Firms with no subsidies in period the 2005-2007 and positive internal R&D expenditures. 
Treated (T): Firms receiving grants on multiple years among 2008-2013. 
Control (C): Firms with no subsidies in period 2008–2013. 
1.
 EXP(DID)-1, presented only for significant models. 
 
Contrary to what was observed with the other models, large firms receiving recurrent 
grants tend to have positive additionality effects. However, these effects are related only 
with external R&D expenditure and therefore, the crowding out effect for large firms 
cannot be discarded. Interestingly, additionality effects for external R&D expenditure in 
86 
 
large firms are the largest of all performed regressions. External R&D expenditure per 
employee and external R&D intensity are 136% and 117% larger than control firms in 
the baseline year; following the Cohen & Levinthal (1990) thesis, those firms could be 
generating absorptive capacities in order to develop internal knowledge in the future. 
However, since it is difficult to believe that these types of companies had not developed 
those capacities previously, our interpretation is that large firms use recurrent grants 
simply to buy machinery, contract turnkey projects, and buy other forms of external 
knowledge. In this sense, if grants public policies are designed to elevate internal firm 
capacities to create future spillovers, a recurrent innovation subsidy policy for large 
firms could be misleading. 
4.5. Conclusions 
In this research, a CDID methodology was used to determine whether Spanish firms 
receiving innovation grants during 2008-2013 present significant input and output 
additionality effects.  
 
Our results are aligned with the previous literature, (Busom, 2000; Almus & 
Czartnitzki, 2003; Heijs & Herrera, 2004; Aerts & Czarnitzki, 2004; Lööf & Heshmati, 
2005; Czarnitzki, et al., 2007; González & Pazó, 2008; Aerts & Schmidt, 2008; Cerulli 
& Potí, 2008; Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2012; Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2013; 
Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2014) given that we found that there are no crowding out 
effects of innovation subsidies. However, this result could only be found for SMEs but 
not in the case of large firms, as it was found by Lach (2002).  
 
In all cases, external R&D expenditures additionality effects were bigger than internal 
R&D effects and therefore, we conclude that grants are a fundamental part of  a firm’s 
absorptive capacities improvement (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), at least for SMEs; in 
addition, SMEs tend to increase R&D employees’ recruitment in number and proportion 
when compared with the control group in the baseline years. No output effects were 
found in any of the subsamples used and our findings are aligned with those of 
Chudnovsky et. al. (2006). However, the use of CDID methodology does not allow us 
to use count or dummy output variables to test the robustness of these results. When the 
results of recurrence in subsidies are observed, firms receiving recurrent grants in the 
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2008-2013 period tend to show more and larger additionality effects than firms 
receiving single grants. 
 
Our results generate important messages for policy makers. First, SMEs tend to have 
greater input and output additionality effects than large firms. Consequently, innovation 
subsidy policies have to be directed mostly to this kind of firms, which, as found in the 
literature, are the companies confronting higher market barriers performing innovation 
(Iammarino, et.al., 2007; Madrid-Guijarro, et.al, 2009). Second, the fact that outcome 
additionality cannot be found require for policy-makers and researchers to find adequate 
variables to measure the long-term effect of innovation subsidies and their spillovers. 
Third, depending on the policy focus, it could be a good move to develop long-time 
innovation aid programs rather than sporadic grants for firms. Though large firms are 
usually the ones with adequate capacities for yearly projects to be granted, and they 
present fewer additionality effects, those long-term policies should be directed to small 
firms with high growth potential because it is through these companies that subsidies 
could generate more long-term innovative spillovers for society.   
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Appendix B. Matching Procedure 
Firms receiving subsidies at least for one year 
Variables 
All firms SME's Large Firms 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) 
lnsize -0.082 0.045 -0.026 0.004 -0.289** 0.022 
group -0.014 0.005 -0.003 0.012 -0.051 -0.009 
foreign 0 -0.002 0.022 -0.009 -0.084 -0.012 
nonue_exp 0.053** -0.017 0.044 -0.008 0.09 -0.018 
barfin -0.022 0.003 -0.016 -0.002 -0.045 0.022 
htmanuf 0.01 0.005 0.014 0.008 -0.008 -0.014 
htserv -0.048*** 0.006 -0.049** 0.013 -0.042 -0.003 
***P. Value<0.01; **P. Value<0.05; *P. Value<0.1 
 
 
Firms receiving subsidies only for one year 
Variables 
All firms SME's Large Firms 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) 
lnsize -0.033 0.064 -0,096 0,019 -0,028 -0,019 
group -0.026 0.026 -0,014 0,005 -0.135** 0,001 
foreign -0.004 0 0,018 -0,012 -0.143* 0,001 
nonue_exp 0.053 -0.003 0,054 -0,017 0,042 -0,032 
barfin 0.002 -0.007 0,007 -0,008 -0,001 0,027 
htmanuf 0.01 -0.002 0,025 0,005 -0,060 0,041 
htserv -0.057** 0.01 -0.061** 0,023 -0,035 -0,002 
***P.Value<0.01; **P. Value<0.05; *P. Value<0.1 
 
 
Firms receiving subsidies for more than one year 
Variables 
All firms SME's Large Firms 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Before 
Matching 
After 
Matching 
Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) Diff. (T-C) 
lnsize -0.109 0.046 0,016 -0,008 -0.414** 0,036 
group -0.006 0.002 0,003 0,018 -0,011 -0,01 
foreign 0.003 0,000 0,024 -0,004 -0,056 0,003 
nonue_exp 0.053* -0.015 0,038 -0,014 0.113* -0,003 
barfin -0.035 0.013 -0,030 0,013 -0,066 0,018 
htmanuf 0.009 0.001 0,008 -0,001 0,017 -0,014 
htserv -0.042** 0.009 -0.042* 0,024 -0,046 -0,012 
***P. Value<0.01; **P. Value<0.05; *P. Value<0.1 
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Chapter 5. Concluding remarks and policy 
implications 
One way to make evident the market and National Systems of Innovation (NSI) 
deficiencies confronted by innovative firms and countries, is via the differences in R&D 
expenditures posted in Chapter 1; private business R&D investment tends to be lower in 
less developed countries. Therefore, one of the main goals of governments and 
academics should be the implementation of a set of policies and institutions focused on 
the increase of private business expenditure on R&D, especially in underdeveloped 
countries, to generate long-term development.  
 
Neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionary economic traditions have researched this 
phenomenon since the beginning, and some policy effects are visible now; for example, 
all over the world the concept of NSI has been adopted by policy-makers in order to 
understand differences between markets’ innovative performance and the ways in which 
those systems could support firms and organizations to overcome innovation 
impediments (Edquist, 2010). However, we are far from a full understanding of the 
effects of market failures on firms’ innovative activities and from the design of a set of 
policies and institutions arranged to overcome those failures. In that sense, this 
dissertation deals with the phenomenon of market failures affecting innovation activities 
and the financial sources of SME innovative firms in Spain and Colombia. The main 
idea behind this thesis was to answer the research question: what are the financing 
sources and innovative particularities of small innovative firms facing innovation 
impediments? 
 
In the second chapter, using data for Spanish SME firms from 2003 and 2013, it was 
shown that perception of innovation impediments is strong in SMEs; those firms tend to 
fail in their innovative ventures via a diverse set of barriers, like economic/financial, 
knowledge, and market impediments. However, until now, no attention was paid to the 
complete process of innovation related to this perception, and the literature tends to 
ignore the fact that firms become involved in innovation to profit from it and focuses 
only on the invention stage where there is still a long path to innovation. 
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In that sense, a separation of invention and commercialization stages was made in order 
to determine whether there are differences in the perception of innovation impediments 
in those stages. The results show that firms tend to perceive knowledge and 
economic/financial barriers in the invention stage. However, the commercialization 
stage is characterized by the perception of market impediments (i.e. those related with 
competition and uncertainty). Firms successfully completing innovation process (i.e. 
selling innovative products and services) have no perception of impediments; ergo, 
firms profiting from innovation ventures are those overcoming market failures. 
 
The management implications of those results are strong. First, firms in the invention 
phase need to ensure the arrival of financing funds in order to overcome successfully 
that stage of the innovation process and therefore, profit from innovation in the near 
future (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 deals with that implication looking at the way firms 
fund their innovation ventures through private sources and the effect of public funding 
innovation within firms). At the same time, firms should solve their high knowledge 
workers vacuum to perform well in the invention phase, this is, they need specialized 
personal capable of fully understand the complex implications of innovation ventures. 
Given that firms with an invention tend to perceive competition and uncertainty (market 
impediments) as major drawbacks, those firms should be prepared to compete with 
consolidated firms with more experience and resources if they want to survive in 
markets. At the same time, those firms might reduce uncertainty using well-established 
methodologies like technological and competitive intelligence or forecasting by 
prospective analysis.  
 
The policy implications of those results are also strong; the fact that firms on the 
commercialization stage tend to perceive only market impediments shows that 
government decision makers could develop better-suited policies in order to diminish 
market failures related un unfair competition and unregulated monopolies. At the same 
time, the fact that firms already profiting from innovation tend to perceive no 
impediments shows that governments can develop policies aimed to reduce all type of 
market failures if they want a complete set of innovation spillovers impacting markets. 
At the same time, policy-makers might enforce the creation and development of 
organizations and institutions related to the generation of high-knowledge workers to 
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support firms in the invention phase (i.e. strength of the education system as a way to 
support firms to overcome innovation impediments). 
 
In Chapter 3, using data from Colombia, it was found that small firms tend to have 
lower access to bank and equity funding to back up their innovation ventures. 
Therefore, these types of firms tend to use internal funds and government subsidies to 
finance those activities. At the same time, firms expending their R&D on tangible assets 
tend to have more access to bank loans. Consequently, firms with high intangible asset 
generation in their innovation processes have lower probabilities of being financed.  
 
The Chapter 3 results can also be contrasted with literature backing a hypothesis of 
Altered Pecking Order given that Colombian firms, no matter which type, follow a 
Pecking Order capital structure to finance their innovative ventures; it was proposed that 
these results are the consequence of an underdeveloped financial market that shortens 
the likelihood of firms using equity as a source of funds for innovation. In this regard, 
government-backed funds are more likely than equity funds in Colombia to perform 
innovation. This is disturbing given that government agencies related to science, 
technology and innovation, specifically in Colombia, have lower budgets to subsidize 
private firms in the country, and given the fact that tax exemptions for R&D projects 
have been granted to big firms in high proportions in the past decades (79%) 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015). In that sense, SMEs in Colombia use 
cash flow because those firms have no access to other funding sources for innovation 
ventures. Thus, the results of total R&D expenditures posted in Figure 1 and Figure 2 
could have a relationship with the development of Colombia’s financial system and 
with the short stock of backed up financial aids from Colombia´s government. 
  
There are other implications of the Chapter 3 results; from the management point of 
view, the fact that intangible assets have a negative relationship with the access to 
external capital is an opportunity for firms and financial institutions to develop a 
relationship based on harmonized systematic reports displaying the stock of intellectual 
capital of SMEs. Some efforts about this topic have been developed in recent years, 
especially with the emergence of the Intellectual Capital Statement made in Europe 
(InCas), which is a report that seeks to systematize embedded knowledge within 
organizations as a source of information for strategic management and to reduce 
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information asymmetries with funding institutions and investors (Mertins & Will, 2007; 
Sánchez, et al., 2012). If those kinds of methodologies arise, it is possible that access to 
external funding for SMEs could be less restricted. However, in Colombia as far as is 
known, there are still no efforts to implement this type of methodology.  
 
The Policy implications are also interesting. Given that SMEs are the ones confronting 
more difficulties in accessing external capital for innovative ventures, governments 
could develop strategies in order to ease the access to that capital, especially in 
countries like Colombia where the public budget for R&D has been shortening in recent 
years. Thus, the development of SME exchange markets could be a medium-term policy 
to give firms access to that long-term capital. In that sense, the KOSDAQ market 
created in 1996 in Korea, TSX venture created in Canada in 1999, and Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) created in 1995 in London are the paradigms to follow 
(World Federation of Exchanges, 2016). In order to allow the creation of such markets, 
it is necessary for governments to make more flexible regulation for SMEs to access 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), and to back up the creation of those kinds of markets 
into the existing regulated ones; at the same time, the creation of a policy to report on 
intellectual capital for those firms, as it was posted in the last paragraph, could be useful 
to diminish agency cost for equity capital in those markets. From the theory point of 
view, this is related with the Edquist (2010) proposal to strengthen NSI by the 
development of a better organizational and institutional framework to finance 
innovation. 
 
At the same time, access to external capital is constricted in relation with banks; the 
literature reviewed and the results of the empirical models of Chapter 2 support the idea 
that financial cost of innovation is higher in relation to other types of investments, so a 
possible policy that governments around the world could use to partially overcome this 
issue is the development of an interest rate subsidy for innovative projects. In many 
economies around the world, interest mortgage subsidy is a policy to improve access to 
homeownership as a way to provide positive spillovers to the economy. The practical 
way to implement that subsidy is to cover one to four percentage points of mortgage 
interest rates for households. Given that innovation creates spillovers in markets also, a 
policy to reduce the interest rates faced by the innovative firm in banking markets could 
elevate the private expenditure in R&D and innovation and their spillovers in economy. 
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The fact that SMEs confront several market failures and that those firms need to 
overcome those failures to effectively profit from innovation (Chapter 2), but at the 
same time, SMEs tend to be restricted to access external sources of funds (Chapter 3), 
leads one to think that a government strategy to grant subsidies to SMEs could be a 
good approach. In relation with the last idea and using data about Spanish firms for the 
2005-2013 period, in Chapter 4 research about the impact of subsidies in long-term 
input and output performance was presented. The results of this research show that 
SMEs present no crowding out effect for R&D internal expenditures. Moreover, there is 
a complementary effect of subsidies. At the same time, absorptive capacities 
improvement, measured as an impact on external R&D expenditure, has positive 
increments after subsidy grants. In the same direction, R&D employees’ recruitment 
rises in the long-term after subsidies; however, output effects on innovation 
performance could not be proved. Simultaneously, in Chapter 4 it was shown that the 
recurrence of subsidies increases the effect on input additionality, therefore, firms 
receiving subsidies in sporadic years tend to be less impacted than firms receiving 
grants in recurrent years. 
 
The management implications of those results are appealing; given that knowledge 
impediments are important in the invention phase of firms (Chapter 2), the fact that 
subsidies in the long-term tend to increase the capacity of firms to contract R&D 
employees could lead firms to apply for subsidies to overcome not only 
economic/financial impediments, but knowledge impediments, too. At the same time, 
given that absorptive capacities of firms tend to be expanded over the years, especially 
if firms receive recurrent subsidies, firms less experienced in developing their own 
innovation projects might apply for grants in order to acquire external R&D; in the 
long-term, that could generate internal and external spillovers for firms, their peers, and 
society (i.e., a “not picking the winner” strategy could in some sense, diminish the lack 
of innovation capabilities within firms).  
 
Concurrently, those results could be a stimulus for firms looking to develop their 
innovation projects through cooperation agreements with clients, peers, universities, and 
government institutions. If the acquisition of external knowledge could expand their 
capabilities to develop innovation, the open innovation framework proposed by 
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Chesbrough (2003), as a way to share knowledge, could also be a form to overcome 
market failures confronted by SMEs; in this sense, policies aimed at the implementation 
of cooperation policies between national and international companies like the Horizon 
2020 – international co-operation program should be implemented all over the world.  
 
Under the same line of thought, there are other results in Chapter 4 that are interesting 
from the policy point of view. First, the fact that outcome additionality could not be 
proved with variables used in this research, and that the literature has found various 
difficulties in the measure of those outcome improvements, could lead to the search for 
new and better outcome variables to include in innovation surveys around the world. At 
the same time, this could lead to shift the attention of policy makers and academics 
towards behavioral variables more suited to evaluate the innovation subsidy policies or 
new methodologies to explain those effects. 
 
Likewise, the fact that additionality effects are greater for SMEs than for large firms 
emphasizes the idea that innovation subsidy policies could be focused on firms 
confronting innovation impediments in higher proportions, like recently created small 
firms, unlike what happens in Colombia. Last, but not least, a policy focused on long-
term innovation aid programs could generate more economic impact than sporadic 
subsidies granted to firms. However, policy-makers might be aware of the types of 
firms granted with these type of policies, given that large firms are better suited to 
present and be awarded with innovation grants. 
 
Finally, all three chapters composing this dissertation expose a number of research lines 
that could be developed in the future, beginning with Chapter 2, it would be interesting 
to determine which policy and management instruments are valid to fully overcome 
impediments of firms on invention and appropriation stages of the innovation process 
especially, knowledge and market impediments that at difference of economic/financial 
impediments have been less studied in the past. In that sense, the open innovation 
framework seems to be promising. 
 
Chapter 3 opens a complete set of new research questions to be answered in the near 
future. First, if financial markets are so important for innovation ventures, what was the 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the flow of innovation around the world? At the 
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same time, even when there are some studies concluding that there is a relationship 
between financial markets’ sophistication and innovation, more attention needs to be 
paid to the underdeveloped countries in which those markets are less developed. In this 
regard, research on the impact that small business stock exchanges of London, Toronto, 
and Korea have had on innovation outcomes at the regional level, and the optimal ways 
in which those kinds of markets could be implemented in underdeveloped countries, 
should be developed from the financial and NSI points of view.  
 
In addition, a research agenda proposed by European studies related to the 
implementation of intellectual capital reports in order to diminish the information 
asymmetry with investors could be put into practice in underdeveloped countries. In the 
short-term, implementing the study cases of firms and banks disposed to use this kind of 
information and in the long-run proposing the development of a government-backed 
implementation exercise in a country like Colombia. 
 
For Chapter 4, the implementation of studies measuring the long-term additionality of 
innovation grants for behavioral variables like willingness to innovate, co-operation, 
open innovation readiness, abandonment of innovation projects, and others could be a 
good starting point to find another type of additionality effect of innovation from the 
microeconomic point of view. 
 
Finally, the great attention displayed in recent decades about the relationship of 
innovation and economic development, draws attention to developing more and 
profound efforts to maximize the levels of private R&D investments, government 
policies, and academic research related to the innovation framework. Those efforts will 
be conducted in the long-term not only to increase economic development but to 
decrease social inequalities. 
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Capítulo 1. Introducción 
Desde sus orígenes, las ciencias económicas se han preocupado sobre las mejores estrategias 
necesarias para generar crecimiento económico tanto en los países como en las regiones. La 
aproximación neo-shumpeteriana basada en las características evolutivas de los mercados ha creado 
una explicación heterodoxa (aunque no nueva) del crecimiento económico generado por el motor de 
la innovación al interior de las empresas. 
 
De esta manera, el crecimiento económico se genera en las empresas cuyo principal objetivo es 
incrementar sus ganancias desarrollando nuevas formas de producción y de procesos relacionados 
con esa producción (Nelson, 1959; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Verspagen, 2005). Según la literatura 
de economía evolucionista, el mecanismo que vincula el crecimiento económico con la innovación 
es la productividad (Nelson, 1959). En consecuencia, Griliches (1988) demostró que los gastos en 
Investigación y Desarrollo (I+D) elevan la productividad de los países y,por ende, tiene un impacto 
importante en el crecimiento a largo plazo de las economías mundiales; Griliches (1988) presenta 
evidencia de la relación entre la disminución de la productividad laboral en los años 70’s y una 
reducción simultánea de los gastos en I+D en Estados Unidos. De manera similar, Brown et al. 
(2009) muestra que existe una conexión entre inversiones privadas en I+D y el crecimiento 
económico que sugiere que el auge de las inversiones en I+D de los años 90’s contribuyó al 
crecimiento en la productividad laboral en la economía de Estados Unidos.  
 
Teniendo en cuenta esta evidencia, es posible inferir que las inversiones en I+D deberían ser un 
proceso extendido en todas las regiones del mundo, especialmente en aquellas menos desarrolladas, 
dado que este tipo de inversión les permitiría generar el crecimiento que las lleve a igualar a las 
economías desarrolladas. Sin embargo, aún existen importantes diferencias en los gastos en I+D 
entre países. Para tratar de superar dichas diferencias los gobiernos alrededor del mundo han 
establecido políticas de innovación dirigidas a elevar los gastos de I+D en el pasado reciente. Un 
ejemplo de estas políticas es la estrategia Horizonte 2020 desarrollada por la Unión Europea (UE), 
en la cual una de sus principales metas es elevar el gasto en I+D a 3% del producto interno bruto 
(PIB) de la UE; otro ejemplo es la estrategia del gobierno colombiano de elevar el gasto en I+D 
hasta el 1% del PIB (De Sabios, 1996). Sin embargo, a la fecha, estas cifras no se han 
alcanzado. 
 
En la Figura 1 se presenta una selección de diecinueve (19) países. En el eje de las abscisas se 
observa el crecimiento anual compuesto de las actividades privadas en I+D (1996 - 2014), el eje de 
las ordenadas muestra el promedio de I+D total como porcentaje del PIB (1996 - 2014) y el tamaño 
de las burbujas representa el promedio de la inversión privada total en I+D como porcentaje del PIB 
(1996-2014). Existen grandes diferencias entre países; por ejemplo, la mayoría de países nórdicos, 
Israel, Japón, Corea y Estados Unidos tienen gastos totales en I+D mayores que la media (1,84%). 
Adicionalmente, México, Portugal, China, España, Dinamarca y Corea están aumentando sus gastos 
privados de I+D a una velocidad mayor que el promedio de los países seleccionados (2,61%). 
Algunas economías como las de Chile, Argentina, Colombia e Italia tienen menores promedios de 
gastos totales y privados en I+D y una tasa de crecimiento anual negativo del 3,15%. A este ritmo, 
las diferencias estructurales de I+D entre países como Colombia, Chile, Argentina e Italia frente al 
desarrollo de países como Israel, Corea y otros, se incrementará en el largo plazo.  
 
Figura 1. Gasto total en I+D de países seleccionados (1996-2014) 
 
Fuente: UNESCO. Chile (2007-2014), México (1996-2011), Noruega (1997-2014), Suecia (1997-
2014), y Estados Unidos (1996-2013) 
 
El hecho de que los países latinoamericanos (Colombia, Chile, Argentina y México) muestran 
gastos y crecimientos en I+D bajos, mientras que en otros países como Israel, Corea o Dinamarca 
estos niveles son altos, lleva a examinar las causas de dichas diferencias entre países. A primera 
vista, las dimensiones de las burbujas en la Figura 1 entregan algunas pistas sobre un fenómeno 
crítico relacionado con la I+D (i.e. el monto privado en gasto en I+D de cada país). Los países con 
los gastos más bajos en I+D como Colombia, Chile, Argentina o México, tienen a su vez bajos 
gastos privados en I+D. En la Figura 2 se muestra una comparación de los gastos en I+D de dichos 
países seleccionados. En países como Colombia, Chile, México o Argentina, la participación de las 
empresas privadas en el gasto total en I+D es mínima, y Colombia tiene el menor nivel de todos los 
países seleccionados con 32% del total de gasto en I+D. Adicionalmente, los países en los cuales el 
total de gasto en I+D está por encima del promedio, presentan altos niveles de participación privada 
en dichos gastos; países como Corea, Japón, Finlandia, Suecia o Israel presentan niveles privados 
superiores al 70% del total de gastos en I+D. 
 
El hecho de que los países latinoamericanos (Colombia, Chile, Argentina y México) muestran 
gastos y crecimientos en I+D bajos, mientras que en otros países como Israel, Corea o Dinamarca 
estos datos son altos, lleva a examinar las causas de dichas diferencias entre países. A primera vista, 
las dimensiones de las burbujas en la Figura 1 entregan algunas pistas sobre un fenómeno crítico 
relacionado con la I+D (i.e. el monto privado en gasto en I+D de cada país). Los países con los 
gastos más bajos en I+D como Colombia, Chile, Argentina o México, tienen a su vez bajos gastos 
privados en I+D. En la Figura 2 se muestra una comparación de los gastos en I+D de dichos países 
seleccionados. En países como Colombia, Chile, México o Argentina, la participación de las 
empresas privadas en el gasto total en I+D es mínima, y Colombia tiene el menor nivel de todos los 
países seleccionados con 32% del total de gasto en I+D. Adicionalmente, los países en los cuales el 
total de gasto en I+D está por encima del promedio, presentan altos niveles de participación privada 
en dichos gastos; países como Corea, Japón, Finlandia, Suecia o Israel presentan niveles privados 
superiores al 70% del total de gastos en I+D. 
 
En ese orden de ideas, es posible argumentar que bajos montos de gasto privado en I+D están 
relacionados con un nivel bajo de inversión total en I+D a nivel nacional. Todavía no entendemos 
completamente las razones detrás de estos bajos niveles de inversión privada en I+D, o que causa 
dichas diferencias entre países, sin embargo, en el último siglo la literatura se ha enfocado en 
algunas explicaciones razonables para este fenómeno. 
 
En primer lugar, existen factores que obstaculizan la inversión de las empresas en actividades de 
I+D. Este problema ha sido investigado desde los trabajos seminales de Nelson (1959) y Arrow 
(1962); en general para Nelson y Arrow, la inversión privada en I+D es altamente riesgosa desde el 
punto de vista financiero debido principalmente a que requiere altos niveles de flujo de caja, es una 
inversión costosa, de largo plazo, incierta y en algunos casos, sus resultados son intangibles. Dichos 
factores son causados por fallas de mercado como la presencia de información asimétrica y la 
imposibilidad de la apropiación total de sus resultados innovadores por parte de las empresas; 
dichas fallas de mercado incrementan el riesgo y por tanto el costo de los proyectos de innovación 
en relación a los proyectos basados en activos tradicionales (Hall & Lerner, 2010). 
 
Figura 2. Gasto total en I+D por sector de ejecución (1996-2014) 
 
Fuente: UNESCO. Chile (2007-2014), México (1996-2011), Noruega (1997-2014), Suecia (1997-
2014), y Estados Unidos (1996-2013). Otros incluyen organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro y 
universidades. 
 
Por lo tanto, las empresas que tratan de implementar actividades de innovación enfrentan fuertes 
impedimentos cuando tratan de recaudar dinero de fuentes internas y externas. En primer lugar, las 
fuentes internas de financiación son escasas y en algunas ocasiones el flujo de caja debe ser 
utilizado para cubrir otros tipos de gastos, especialmente si la compañía tiene restricciones de caja, 
como es usual en el caso de compañías pequeñas y jóvenes (Hall & Lerner, 2010). Adicionalmente, 
las empresas innovadoras que intentan captar recursos de fuentes externas enfrentan altos costos 
financieros directos y costos hundidos dada la naturaleza intangible de la innovación y sus 
características inciertas. Por lo tanto, todos aquellos factores que determinan la forma en que las 
empresas innovadoras financian sus gastos en Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación (I+D+i) 
deberían ser comprendidos para generar políticas óptimas que permitan elevar el gasto de las 
empresas en I+D, especialmente en el caso de empresas, países y regiones con bajas actividades de 
innovación como aquellos incluidos en la Figura 1. En años recientes, se ha hecho énfasis en el 
estudio de dichas fallas por parte de los investigadores en barreras a la innovación utilizando 
encuestas de innovación. 
 
En segundo lugar, algunos académicos han propuesto que las diferencias en los niveles de gasto en 
innovación en los países, como aquellos presentados en la Figura 1 y Figura 2, pueden deberse a las 
diferentes mezclas y relaciones organizacionales e institucionales presentes en mercados 
innovadores en todos los países. Para economías en las que el gasto en I+D es bajo, es consistente 
pensar que el desarrollo de organizaciones sólidas que respalden la innovación es necesario, en ese 
sentido, una de las funciones principales de aquellas organizaciones e instituciones es facilitar la vía 
en que las empresas y de manera general, los mercados, perciben y enfrentan las barreras a la 
innovación. Esta aproximación académica se inició con los trabajos seminales de Freeman (1987), 
Lundvall (1992) y Nelson (1993); para Freeman estas relaciones se enmarcan en lo que se conoce 
como el Sistema Nacional de Innovación (SNI), que él define como “la red de instituciones en los 
sectores público y privado cuyas actividades e interacciones inician, importan, modifican y 
difunden nuevas tecnologías”. 
 
De la misma manera, Edquist (2010), propone que una de las actividades fundamentales del SNI es 
la financiación de actividades privadas de innovación facilitando la comercialización y adopción de 
tecnologías; para países con bajas cantidades de gasto en I+D privado, es posible que algunos de los 
marcos institucionales y organizacionales ya desarrollados en países como Israel, Corea y otros 
países no estén completamente desarrollados. En ese sentido, los investigadores han tratado de 
descubrir las complejidades de la relación entre los impedimentos, la financiación y el marco 
institucional de la innovación, tratando de entender las causas que están detrás de las diferencias en 
gasto en I+D alrededor del mundo. A ese respecto, desde Schumpeter se ha argumentado que la 
relación entre innovación y sus enramados financieros es fundamental para entender los ciclos 
económicos y el desarrollo: 
 
La relación lógica (...), entre lo que es llamado “creación de crédito por parte de los bancos” 
y la innovación, no se perderá de nuevo. Esta relación, que es fundamental para el 
entendimiento del motor capitalista, es la base de todos los problemas de dinero y crédito, 
dado que no son simples problemas de finanzas públicas (Schumpeter, 1939, p. 111). 
 
Adicionalmente, Schumpeter entendió que hay algunos problemas con la relación entre mercados 
financieros e innovación creados por las asimetrías en la información, y que estas fallas hacen que 
las organizaciones de los mercados financieros malinterpreten el fenómeno de la innovación: 
 
...El fracaso de la comunidad bancaria para funcionar en la forma requerida por la estructura 
de la máquina capitalista genera la mayor cantidad de eventos que la mayoría de 
observadores denominan “catástrofes”. Es apenas natural que como dichas fallas se 
muestran en primera instancia cuando se trata de propuestas innovadoras -en donde juzgar 
adecuadamente es difícil y la tentación es fuerte- se ha desarrollado una asociación entre la 
financiación de la innovación y el rechazo o mala práctica que, aunque es entendible, no 
facilita el análisis (Schumpeter, 1939, pp. 117-118). 
 
Sin embargo, a pesar de que gran número de esfuerzos se han hecho en el último siglo para entender 
las barreras a la innovación, los engranajes financieros y el marco de la innovación, e incluso ahora 
cuando existen microdatos disponibles para investigar este problema, es todavía difícil para las 
empresas, la academia y los responsables de la política, comprender el fenómeno de la financiación 
a inversión de la innovación a fondo. Por lo tanto, las empresas aún enfrentan fallas que impiden el 
gasto en I+D privado y desaceleran el ritmo de la productividad, y los países aún necesitan 
implementar un marco institucional que respalde la financiación de innovación privada, 
especialmente en economías subdesarrolladas. 
 
La literatura relacionada con la financiación de la innovación nos ha hecho saber que las empresas 
innovadoras jóvenes, pequeñas y de alta tecnología tienden a enfrentar impedimentos a la 
innovación en una proporción superior que sus contrapartes; adicionalmente, la evolución de los 
mercados financieros ha servido para la creación de instrumentos como el capital de riesgo e 
instituciones como mercados de valores para pequeñas empresas como una forma de superar los 
impedimentos de las compañías innovadoras y de rápido crecimiento. Sin embargo, estos 
instrumentos e instituciones son altamente especializadas y no están disponibles para todas las 
empresas, especialmente en mercados emergentes en donde el número de empresas dedicadas a la 
inversión en capital de riesgo o el número de ángeles inversionistas es mínimo. Es en ese sentido en 
que la aproximación a los SNI de Edquist (2010) es relevante (i.e. es necesario crear y desarrollar 
instrumentos e instituciones financieras que respalden la actividad innovadora). 
 
De igual forma, aunque la literatura ha revelado algunas pistas sobre la forma en que las grandes 
empresas transadas en bolsas de valores financian sus proyectos de innovación, todavía no 
entendemos totalmente cómo las fallas de mercado y los impedimentos a la innovación forjan la 
estructura de capital de las empresas más pequeñas que no son transadas de forma pública. De tal 
forma, para las empresas que enfrentan fuertes impedimentos a la innovación, los gobiernos 
alrededor del mundo han desarrollados instrumentos financieros como subsidios con la finalidad de 
incrementar la actividad innovadora y generar efectos positivos de “derramamiento” (spill-over 
effects) en los mercados. Sin embargo, aún no entendemos totalmente los efectos que estos 
instrumentos tienen en el comportamiento de largo plazo de las empresas innovadoras. 
 
Múltiples dudas adicionales permanecen sin responder en el marco de la relación financiación-
innovación. Esta tesis es un pequeño esfuerzo para incrementar el conocimiento sobre este 
fenómeno usando microdatos de empresas localizadas en España y Colombia; en general, esta 
investigación se enfoca en una amplia pregunta de investigación: ¿cuáles son las fuentes de 
financiamiento y las particularidades innovadoras de las pequeñas empresas innovadoras que 
enfrentan impedimentos a la innovación? 
 
De igual forma, esta investigación trata de responder algunas preguntas de investigación específicas 
que serán respondidas en cada uno de los siguientes capítulos: 
 
Capítulo 2: 
● ¿En qué fase del proceso innovador las pequeñas empresas tienden a percibir impedimentos 
financieros, de conocimiento y de mercado relacionados con el fenómeno innovador? 
● ¿Cuáles son los impedimentos percibidos por las empresas que ya se benefician de los 
resultados de la innovación? 
 
Capítulo 3: 
● ¿Cuáles son las principales características de las empresas financiando sus actividades 
innovadoras a través de fuentes de fondos internas, bancos, fuentes de capital y fuentes 
públicas? 
● ¿Cómo puede caracterizarse la estructura de capital de empresas que realizan actividades de 
innovación en un país subdesarrollado como Colombia? 
 
Capítulo 4: 
● ¿cuáles son los impactos de largo plazo de los subsidios concedidos por el gobierno en las 
variables de entrada y salida de innovación de las empresas? 
● ¿Cuál es el efecto de largo plazo de la recurrencia de los subsidios a la innovación en los 
resultados innovadores de las compañías? 
 
Proveer respuestas para estas preguntas es fundamental desde el punto de vista de la política dado 
que permitirá el desarrollo de mejores medidas de intervención, organizaciones e instituciones para 
que las empresas puedan sobreponerse a los impedimentos de la innovación, financiar proyectos de 
innovación más eficientemente y como resultado, generar conocimiento, productos y procesos 
innovadores más eficientemente y en el largo plazo, generar crecimiento económico. 
Específicamente esta investigación trata sobre el efecto de los impedimentos a la innovación, la 
financiación de la innovación y los subsidios públicos en pequeñas y medianas Vs. grandes 
empresas, dado que las primeras tienden a percibir las fallas de mercado en mayor proporción (Hall 
& Lerner, 2010). 
 
Datos y metodología  
Recolectar datos sobre la actividad innovadora y el comportamiento financiero de las empresas 
innovadoras no es una tarea fácil, y recolectar dicha información de manera que sea comparable es 
aún más difícil. Sin embargo, desde el inicio de los años 90 algunos países han desarrollado la 
titánica tarea de reunir información sobre las actividades de innovación al nivel de la empresa como 
una medida para generar mejores indicadores de innovación que los típicos usados en los años 70 y 
80. En este sentido, en 1992 la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico 
(OCDE) emitió el Manual de Oslo; este documento fue desarrollado para dos metas principales, 
proveer una guía para crear, medir y comparar indicadores de innovación al interior de los 
miembros de la OCDE y discutir los problemas analíticos para los cuales esos indicadores son 
relevantes (OECD, 1997). 
 
Siguiendo las directrices del Manual de Oslo, la UE desarrolló la Encuesta de Innovación 
Comunitaria (Community Innovation Survey - CIS) como un esfuerzo a gran escala para 
comparar las variables de entrada y de salida de las actividades de innovación de las 
empresas de la UE (Arundel & Smith, 2013), y desde el año 2004 esta encuesta ha sido 
aplicada cada dos años. Un caso especial de la CIS es el Panel de Innovación Tecnológica 
(PITEC). Esta encuesta desarrollada por el gobierno español es llevada a cabo de forma 
anual y es accesible de manera libre. Para el propósito de esta investigación la base de datos 
de PITEC ha sido usada en el capítulo 2 (2003-2013) en un intento por medir la percepción 
de impedimentos de innovación de pequeñas y medianas empresas (Pymes) y en el capítulo 
4 (2007-2013) para medir los impactos de los subsidios de innovación en la actividad 
innovadora de las compañías españolas. 
 
Siguiendo las actividades de las encuestas de innovación de la UE, otras regiones del 
mundo han desarrollado sus propias encuestas de innovación basadas en los criterios del 
Manual de Oslo, especialmente en Latinoamérica (Salazar & Holbrook, 2004). En ese 
sentido, debe prestarse especial atención a los ejercicios desarrollados en países como 
México, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador o Colombia. En el caso de Colombia, se han 
desarrollado dos encuestas, la primera para empresas de manufactura (EDIT-Encuesta de 
innovación tecnológica) y la segunda para empresas del sector comercio y servicios 
(EDITS). Estas encuestas han sido llevadas a cabo desde el año 2005 y 2006 
respectivamente; para el caso específico de esta investigación, la EDIT entre los años 2008 
y 2009 fue utilizada en el capítulo 3 para determinar las fuentes de financiación que las 
empresas innovadoras colombianas usan para financiar sus proyectos de innovación. 
 
Las metodologías usadas en esta investigación fueron modelos probit de panel, modelos 
probit multivariados y modelos de diferencia en diferencia condicionada (CDID); cada una 
de estas metodologías fue usada para superar algunas problemáticas y ventajas de los datos 
usados. Adicionalmente, algunas limitaciones de esta investigación se desprenden de los 
datos y las metodologías escogidas. En primer lugar, en el caso de Colombia, sólo una ola 
de la EDIT estuvo disponible aun cuando existen múltiples olas de esta encuesta; el acceso 
limitado a las salas de acceso seguro en la oficina del Departamento Nacional de 
Innovación (DANE) en Bogotá y las restricciones sobre la transferencia internacional de los 
datos no permitió el acceso a otras olas de la encuesta. Aún más, los datos de la EDIT entre 
2008 y 2009 no permiten el acceso a variables de salida empresarial como las ventas, que 
habrían sido valiosas como forma de referencia cruzada sobre el comportamiento financiero 
de las compañías. De igual forma, en el caso de los efectos de largo plazo de los subsidios 
públicos de innovación de las empresas españolas, la metodología CDID utiliza una 
aproximación lineal para medir el comportamiento innovador de las empresas, de tal forma, 
variables de comportamiento empresarial (Behavioral) como la cooperación, propensión a 
innovar y patentar son medidas por PITEC como variables binarias o de conteo; de tal 
forma, no fue posible verificar si existen efectos de largo plazo en variables de 
comportamiento de las empresas innovadoras. 
 
Esta tesis está organizada de la siguiente forma. En el capítulo 2 se incluye una 
investigación sobre la percepción de los impedimentos a la innovación para Pymes de 
manufactura españolas para los años 2005 a 2013. Este capítulo trata de develar la forma en 
que los impedimentos a la innovación actúan sobre las empresas durante el proceso 
innovador desde una perspectiva dinámica; en ese sentido, se presta especial atención a las 
formas que toman las fallas de mercado a través de la percepción de impedimentos a la 
innovación de las empresas desde el principio hasta el fin del proceso de innovación 
empresarial. En el capítulo 3 se presenta una investigación que trata sobre las fuentes de 
financiación y la estructura de capital de las empresas innovadoras colombianas; 
específicamente este capítulo muestra los efectos que las fallas de mercado tienen en el 
acceso a fuentes de financiación como flujo de caja, bancos, capital y subsidios públicos en 
un país con un mercado financiero subdesarrollado y con la estructura de los mercados de 
capital en países en vía de desarrollo. En el capítulo 4, y dado que las empresas que 
enfrentan una mayor proporción de fallas de mercado tienden a tener baja inversión en I+D, 
se desarrolla una investigación sobre los efectos de largo plazo que tienen los subsidios de 
innovación en compañías españolas. En este capítulo se presta especial atención en los 
efectos que dichos subsidios tienen en variables de entrada y salida del proceso innovador y 
en el tamaño de la empresa como una variable fundamental para determinar dichos efectos. 
Finalmente, en el capítulo 5, se presentan las conclusiones generales de la tesis, los 
impactos en términos de política y propuestas para una futura agenda de investigación. 
 
La forma funcional que se le dio a esta tesis, separada en tres capítulos con objetivos y 
preguntas de investigación diferentes pero relacionadas entre sí, tiene como objetivo el 
sometimiento de corto plazo  de estos capítulos a revistas revisadas por pares académicos 
una vez que la tesis sea aprobada. Adicionalmente, aunque mi función en todos los 
capítulos fue la de investigador principal, los coautores de los capítulos 2 y 4 son Juan 
Carlos Salazar y Asunción López López de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid y quiero 
darles crédito. Para el capítulo 3 recibí valiosas contribuciones de Florentino Malaver y 
Marisela Vargas de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, especialmente en cuanto a factores 
relacionados con la recolección de datos. Aun cuando valoro de gran forma la colaboración 
de estas personas en el desarrollo de la tesis, los errores presentes en la misma son de mi 
entera responsabilidad. 
  
Capítulo 5: Conclusiones e implicaciones de política 
Una manera de poner de manifiesto las deficiencias en los mercados y en el Sistema 
Nacional de Innovación (SNI) a las que se enfrentan las empresas innovadoras y los países, 
es a través de las diferencias en gasto en I+D presentadas en el Capítulo 1; las inversiones 
en I+D de las empresas privadas tienden a ser más bajas en países menos desarrollados. Por 
lo anterior, uno de los principales objetivos de la los gobiernos y la academia debería ser la 
implementación de un conjunto de políticas e instrumentos enfocados en el incremento del 
gasto de empresas privadas en I+D, especialmente en países en vía de desarrollo para 
generar desarrollo de largo plazo. 
 
La tradición neo-Schumpeterianna y de la economía evolutiva han investigado este 
fenómeno desde sus inicios y algunos efectos políticos son visibles ahora; por ejemplo, 
alrededor del mundo el concepto de SNI ha sido adoptado por los responsables de políticas 
con el fin de entender las diferencias entre el desempeño de los mercados innovadores y las 
formas en las que esos sistemas pueden apoyar empresas y organizaciones en superar 
impedimentos a la innovación (Edquist, 2010). Sin embargo, estamos lejos de tener un 
completo entendimiento de los efectos de las fallas de mercado en las actividades 
innovadoras de las empresas y del diseño de un grupo de políticas y de un marco 
institucional para superar dichas fallas. En ese sentido, esta tesis aborda el fenómeno de las 
fallas de mercado y cómo éstas afectan las actividades de innovación y las fuentes de 
financiación de las Pymes en España y Colombia. La idea principal detrás de esta tesis era 
responder a la pregunta de investigación: ¿cuáles son las fuentes de financiación y las 
particularidades innovadoras de empresas innovadoras pequeñas que enfrentan barreras 
para la innovación? 
 
En el segundo capítulo, utilizando datos para Pymes españolas entre el año 2005 y 2013, se 
mostró que la percepción de impedimentos a la innovación es particularmente fuerte en las 
Pyme; estas empresas tienden a fallar en sus proyectos de innovación debido a un conjunto 
diverso de impedimentos. Sin embargo, hasta ahora, no se había prestado atención al 
proceso completo de innovación relacionado a esta percepción y la literatura tiende a 
ignorar el hecho que las empresas se involucran en proceso de innovación para obtener 
beneficios económicos y se enfoca solamente en la fase de invención desde la cual todavía 
falta un largo camino para la innovación. 
 
En ese sentido, se realizó una separación entre los estadios de invención y comercialización 
para determinar si existen diferencias en la percepción de impedimentos a la innovación en 
dichas fases. Los resultados muestran que las empresas tienden a percibir impedimentos de 
conocimiento y económico/financieros en la fase de invención. Sin embargo, el fracaso en 
la fase de comercialización de las invenciones es caracterizada por la percepción de 
impedimentos de mercado (i.e. relacionados con competencia e incertidumbre). Las 
empresas que exitosamente completan el proceso de innovación (i.e. venden productos y 
servicios innovadores) no perciben impedimentos a la innovación, ergo, las empresas que 
obtienen beneficios en ventas de la innovación son aquellas que pueden superar dichos 
impedimentos. 
 
Las implicaciones de gestión para las empresas de estos resultados son importantes. 
Primero, las empresas que se encuentran en una fase de invención necesitan asegurar la 
llegada de fondos de financiación para sobreponerse exitosamente a dicha fase del proceso 
de innovación y por tanto, obtener rentabilidades en el futuro cercano (los capítulos 3 y 4 se 
basan en esa implicación investigando las formas en que las empresas financian sus 
iniciativas de innovación a través de fuentes privadas y el efecto de la financiación pública 
de la innovación al interior de las empresas). Al mismo tiempo, las empresas deben resolver 
su vacío de trabajadores con conocimiento especializado para obtener buenos resultados en 
la fase de invención, es decir, necesitan personal especializado capaz de entender 
completamente las complejas implicaciones de los proyectos de innovación.  
 
Dado que las empresas con invenciones tienden a percibir la competencia e incertidumbre 
(impedimentos de mercado) como sus principales inconvenientes, estas empresas deben 
estar preparadas para competir con empresas consolidadas, con más recursos y más 
experiencia si quieren sobrevivir en los mercados. Al mismo tiempo, estas empresas 
podrían reducir la incertidumbre usando metodologías establecidas de tiempo atrás como 
son la vigilancia tecnológica y competitiva o el pronóstico por medio del análisis 
prospectivo. 
 
Las implicaciones de política de dichos resultados son también interesantes; el hecho de 
que las empresas en el estadio de comercialización tienden a percibir únicamente 
impedimentos de mercado muestra que los tomadores de decisiones de políticas en los 
gobiernos podrían desarrollar políticas más adecuadas para disminuir las fallas de mercado 
relacionadas con la competencia desleal y los monopolios desregulados. De igual forma, 
dado que las empresas que ya obtienen ingresos de productos y servicios innovadores 
tienden a no percibir ningún tipo de impedimentos, muestra que los gobiernos deberían 
desarrollar políticas dirigidas a disminuir todos los impedimentos de la innovación si 
quieren generar un conjunto completo de efectos de derramamiento que impacten a los 
mercados. De la misma forma, los encargados de política deberían reforzar la creación de 
organizaciones e instituciones relacionadas con la generación de trabajadores de alto 
conocimiento para apoyar a las empresas que se encuentran en las fases de invención (i.e. 
reforzamiento del sistema de educación como una forma para apoyar a las empresas para 
superar los impedimentos a la innovación). 
 
En el capítulo 3 y usando datos para Colombia, se encontró que las pequeñas empresas 
tienden a tener un menor acceso a bancos y a financiación de capital para respaldar sus 
proyectos innovadores que las grandes empresas. De tal forma, este tipo de compañías 
tienden a usar fondos internos y subsidios gubernamentales para financiar dichas 
actividades. De igual forma, las empresas que tienen una alta proporción de gastos en 
innovación dirigidos a la compra de activos intangibles tienden a tener menor acceso a 
préstamos bancarios. En consecuencia, las empresas con alta generación de activos 
intangibles dentro de su proceso de innovación tienden a tener menores probabilidades de 
ser financiadas mediante recursos bancarios.  
 
Los resultados del capítulo 3 también pueden ser contrastados frente a la literatura que 
respalda la hipótesis de una estructura de capital basada en un Orden Jerárquico Alterado 
(Altered Pecking Order) para financiar sus proyectos de innovación. Se propone que estos 
resultados son consecuencia de un mercado financiero subdesarrollado que disminuye la 
posibilidad de las firmas de usar fuentes de capital como fuentes de fondos para la 
innovación. En relación a este último punto, la financiación para hacer innovación 
respaldada por el gobierno es más probable que la financiación respaldada con fuentes de 
capital. Este hecho es perturbador dado que las agencias gubernamentales colombianas 
relacionadas con ciencia tecnología e innovación tienen bajos presupuestos para subsidiar 
la inversión de empresas privadas y dado el hecho que las exenciones impositivas han sido 
concedidas en su gran mayoría a grandes empresas (79%) en décadas pasadas 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015). En este sentido, las Pymes en Colombia 
usan flujo de caja para financiar sus proyectos de innovación dado que no tienen acceso a 
otras fuentes de financiación. De tal forma, las cifras de los gastos en innovación exhibidas 
en las Figura 1 y Figura 2 pueden estar relacionadas con el desarrollo del sistema financiero 
colombiano y con la baja cifra de ayudas gubernamentales para la innovación desde el 
gobierno colombiano. 
 
Existen otras implicaciones de los resultados del Capítulo 3; desde el punto de vista de la 
gestión de la innovación, el hecho que los activos intangibles tengan una relación negativa 
con el acceso a capital externo es una oportunidad para las compañías e instituciones 
financieras para desarrollar una relación basada en un sistema armonizado de reportes que 
muestren los valores y formas de gestionar el capital intelectual al interior de las Pymes. 
Algunos esfuerzos sobre este tema se han desarrollado en años recientes, especialmente con 
la creación del Informe de Capital Intelectual realizado en Europa (Incas), que es un reporte 
que busca sistematizar el conocimiento embebido al interior de las organizaciones como 
una fuente de información para la gestión estratégica y para reducir las asimetrías de 
información con las instituciones financiadoras e inversionistas (Mertins & Will, 2007; 
Sánchez, et al., 2012). El surgimiento de este tipo de metodologías hará que el acceso a 
fuentes externas de financiamiento por parte de las Pymes sea menos restringido. Sin 
embargo, en Colombia por lo que se sabe, no existen aún esfuerzos para implementarlas. 
 
Las implicaciones de política de estos resultados son también interesantes. Dado que las 
Pymes son las empresas que enfrentan en mayor proporción las dificultades de acceso a 
fuentes externas de financiamiento para proyectos innovadores, los gobiernos deberían 
desarrollar estrategias para facilitar el acceso a dicho capital, especialmente en países como 
Colombia en donde los presupuestos públicos para la I+D han venido recortándose en años 
recientes. En ese mismo orden de ideas, el desarrollo de bolsas de valores para Pymes 
puede ser una política de mediano plazo para dar acceso a las empresas a capital en el largo 
plazo. En ese sentido, el mercado KOSDAQ creado en 1996 en Corea, la Bolsa TSX 
Venture desarrollada en Canadá en 1999 y el Mercado Alternativo de Inversiones (AIM) 
creado en 1995 en Londres son los paradigmas dignos de seguir (World Federation of 
Exchanges, 2016). Para permitir la creación de dichos mercados es necesario que los 
gobiernos apliquen mayor flexibilidad en la regulación sobre las Pymes y sus ofertas 
públicas iniciales (IPOs) y que respalden la creación de dicho tipo de mercados dentro de 
los existentes actualmente; al mismo tiempo, la creación de políticas para que las empresas 
de estos mercados reporten también su capital intelectual, como se propuso en el párrafo 
anterior, puede ser útil para disminuir los costos de agencia de recaudar capital por medio 
de las bolsas de valores. Desde el punto de vista teórico, esta idea se relaciona con la 
propuesta de Edquist sobre el fortalecimiento de los SNI por medio del desarrollo de un 
mejor entramado organizacional e institucional para financiar la innovación. 
 
Al mismo tiempo, el acceso de las Pymes a fuentes externas de financiación está restringido 
en relación a los bancos; la literatura revisada y los resultados empíricos del Capítulo 2 
soportan la idea de que los costos financieros de la innovación es alto en relación a otros 
tipos de inversiones empresariales, de tal manera, una política que los gobiernos de todo el 
mundo podrían utilizar para superar parcialmente esta problemática es la del desarrollo de 
un subsidio de tasa de interés para proyectos innovadores. En muchas economías alrededor 
del mundo, el subsidio de tasa de interés a las hipotecas es una política para mejorar el 
acceso a la compra de casa propia como una manera de proveer externalidades positivas a 
la economía. La forma práctica de implementar dicho subsidio es el cubrimiento de uno a 
cuatro puntos porcentuales del interés hipotecario para las familias. Dado que el gasto en 
innovación también crea efectos de derramamiento y externalidades positivas en los 
mercados, una política para reducir la tasa de interés que enfrentan las empresas 
innovadoras en los mercados bancarios podría elevar el nivel de gasto privado en I+D y los 
efectos de derramamiento en la economía. 
 
Dado que las Pymes enfrentan muchas fallas de mercado e impedimentos a la innovación y 
que dichas empresas necesitan superar dichas fallas e impedimentos para generar ingresos 
en sus proyectos innovadores (Capítulo 2), pero al mismo tiempo, las Pymes tienden a tener 
restricciones para acceder a fuentes externas de financiación (Capítulo 3), lleva a pensar 
que la estrategia gubernamental de otorgar subsidios a las Pymes puede ser una buena 
aproximación.  
 
En relación con esta última idea y usando datos de empresas españolas en el periodo 2005-
2013, en el Capítulo 4 se realizó una investigación sobre el impacto de los subsidios de 
innovación en variables de innovadoras de entrada y salida en el largo plazo. Los resultados 
de esta investigación muestran que las Pymes no presentan un efecto de desplazamiento de 
su inversión en I+D (Crowding-out effect). Más aún, las Pymes muestran un efecto de 
complementariedad frente a dichos subsidios. Al mismo tiempo, las capacidades de 
absorción de las empresas, medidas por medio del gasto externo en I+D, tienen incrementos 
positivos luego de la recepción de subsidios. En la misma dirección, el reclutamiento de 
empleados en I+D se incrementa en el largo plazo a causa de los subsidios. 
Simultáneamente, en el Capítulo 4 se mostró que la recurrencia de los subsidios incrementa 
los efectos en la adicionalidad de dichas variables, por lo tanto, las empresas que reciben 
subsidios esporádicamente tienen a presentar menores impactos que las empresas que 
reciben subsidios de forma recurrente. 
 
Las implicaciones en la gestión empresarial de dichos resultados son atractivas; dado que 
los impedimentos de conocimiento son importantes en la fase de invención de las empresas 
(Capítulo 2), el hecho de que los subsidios en el largo plazo incrementan la capacidad de 
las empresas para contratar empleados de I+D podría llevar a éstas a aplicar a subsidios 
para solucionar no solo los impedimentos económicos/financieros sino también los de 
conocimiento. Al mismo tiempo, dado que las capacidades de absorción de las empresas 
tienden a expandirse con el tiempo, especialmente si las empresas reciben subsidios 
recurrentes, las empresas menos experimentadas en desarrollar sus propios proyectos 
deberían aplicar a subsidios con la finalidad de adquirir I+D externo; en el largo plazo esto 
podría generar efectos de derramamiento interno y externo para las empresas, sus pares y la 
sociedad (i.e. una estrategia de “no seleccionar al ganador” puede de alguna manera, 
disminuir la falta de capacidades de innovación de las compañías). 
 
Simultáneamente, estos resultados pueden ser un estímulo para las empresas que buscan 
desarrollar proyectos de innovación mediante acuerdos de cooperación con clientes, pares, 
universidades e instituciones gubernamentales. Si la adquisición de conocimiento externo 
puede expandir sus capacidades para realizar innovación, el esquema de innovación abierta 
desarrollado por Chesbrough (2003) como una forma de compartir el conocimiento, 
también puede ser una forma de superar las barreras de mercado enfrentadas por las Pymes; 
en ese sentido, políticas dirigidas hacia la implementación de acuerdos de cooperación 
entre empresas nacionales e internacionales, como el programa Horizonte 2020, deberían 
ser implementadas en todo el mundo.  
 
Bajo la misma línea de pensamiento, existen otros resultados del Capítulo 4 que son 
interesantes desde el punto de vista de la implementación de políticas. En primer lugar, el 
hecho que no pudo probarse una adicionalidad de salida (outcome) con las variables usadas 
en esta investigación, y dado que la literatura también ha encontrado múltiples dificultades 
para medir dichas adicionalidades en las variables de salida, puede llevar a la búsqueda de 
nuevas y mejores variables para ser incluidas en las encuestas de innovación de todo el 
mundo. Al mismo tiempo, esto podría llevar a llamar la atención de los encargados de 
política y académicos hacia variables de comportamiento empresarial (behavioral) más 
ajustadas para evaluar las políticas de subsidios a la innovación o nuevas metodologías para 
explicar dichos efectos. 
 
Igualmente, el hecho que los efectos de adicionalidad son superiores para las Pymes que 
para las grandes empresas, enfatiza la idea que los subsidios podrían ser focalizados en 
empresas que enfrentan impedimentos a la innovación en mayor proporción como las 
empresas de reciente creación, al contrario de lo que sucede en Colombia. Por último, 
aunque no menos importante, una política enfocada en programas de apoyo de largo plazo 
podría generar mayores impactos económicos que subsidios generados esporádicamente. 
Sin embargo, los encargados de política deben estar al tanto del tipo de empresas que son 
financiadas con estas políticas dado que las grandes empresas están mejor preparadas para 
presentarse y ser financiadas con este tipo de subsidios. 
 
Finalmente, los tres capítulos de investigación que componen esta tesis exponen un buen 
número de líneas de investigación que podrían ser desarrolladas en el futuro, iniciando con 
el Capítulo 2, sería interesante determinar cuáles instrumentos de política e instrumentos de 
gestión son válidos para superar completamente los impedimentos de las empresas que se 
encuentran en las fases de invención y comercialización del proceso de innovación, 
especialmente, los relacionados con los impedimentos de conocimiento y de mercado que 
han sido menos estudiados en el pasado. En ese sentido, el enfoque de la economía abierta 
parece ser prometedor. 
 
El Capítulo 3 abre un conjunto completo de preguntas de investigación para ser 
desarrolladas en el futuro próximo. Primero, si los mercados financieros son tan 
importantes para los proyectos de innovación, ¿cuál fue el impacto de la crisis financiera de 
2008 en el flujo de innovación en el mundo? De igual forma, aun cuando existen estudios 
que concluyen que existe una relación entre la sofisticación de los mercados financieros y 
la innovación, debería prestarse más atención a los países en vía de desarrollo en donde 
estos mercados están menos desarrollados. Respecto a esto, el impacto que los mercados de 
valores de pequeñas empresas en Londres, Toronto y Corea han tenido sobre los resultados 
de innovación a nivel regional y las formas óptimas en las cuales dichos mercados podrían 
ser implementados en países en vía de desarrollo, deberían ser investigados desde el punto 
de vista financiero y de los SNI. 
 
Adicionalmente, una agenda de investigación propuesta por estudios europeos relacionados 
con la implementación de reportes de capital intelectual como una forma de disminuir la 
asimetría de información entre inversionistas, podría ponerse en práctica en países en vía de 
desarrollo. En el corto plazo implementando estudios de caso de empresas y bancos 
dispuestas a usar este tipo de información y en el largo plazo, proponiendo el desarrollo de 
políticas respaldadas a nivel gubernamental para la implementación de este tipo de reportes 
en países como Colombia. 
 
Para el Capítulo 4, la implementación de estudios que midan la adicionalidad de largo plazo 
de los subsidios de innovación para variables de comportamiento empresarial como 
propensión a innovar, cooperación, disponibilidad para la innovación abierta, abandono de 
proyectos entre otras, puede ser un buen punto de partida para encontrar otro tipo de efectos 
de los subsidios desde el punto de vista microeconómico. 
 
Finalmente, la gran atención prestada en décadas recientes a la relación entre innovación y 
desarrollo económico debería llamar nuestra atención para desarrollar una mayor cantidad y 
una mayor profundidad de esfuerzos para maximizar los niveles de I+D privados, políticas 
gubernamentales e investigación por parte de la academia relacionadas con el marco de la 
innovación. Dichos esfuerzos conducirán en el largo plazo no sólo a incrementar el 
desarrollo económico sino también a disminuir las inequidades sociales.  
